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I. INTRODUCTION
The private attorney general is a creature of domestic law, designed to
assist government agencies in enforcing various statutes through private
causes of action. 1 As the growth in transnational commerce has necessitated
the more frequent application of those statutes in international settings, the
private attorney general has come to play a role on the global stage as well.
This role involves both the private interests of an individual plaintiff and the
public interests embodied in the statutory laws being enforced. Precisely
because of this dual role, the private attorney general can also serve as a
useful tool for exploring developments in international economic regulation.
This Article uses the role of the private attorney general to examine the
growing inconsistency in judicial evaluations of the public interests at stake in
regulatory disputes.
Just as litigation initiated by private attorneys general incorporates both
public and private interests, international regulatory disputes involve elements
2of both public and private law. Because international commerce necessarily
involves parties and affects interests in multiple jurisdictions, it comprises
behavior over which two or more countries may simultaneously seek to assert
regulatory jurisdiction. International economic regulation is, in this sense, a
matter of public law, turning on the government's interest in setting economic
policy and on the scope of its authority to do so. 3 At the same time, however,
international commercial transactions between private actors-the means
through which most international activity is conducted-are the subject of
private law.4 Thus, analysis of international economic law reveals an
interesting polarity between the public interests emphasized in economic
regulation by sovereign entities and the private interests emphasized in the
daily business of international commerce.
1. Statutes may incorporate a mechanism supporting private litigants' claims based on
statutory violations. Plaintiffs initiating actions under such laws are described as private attorneys
general, and the litigation they generate supplements government enforcement of those statutes. Section
IH.A infra.
2. Traditionally, public law is seen to encompass rules relating to the governmental finction
and to the relationship between a state and individuals, while private law is seen to govern relationships
between individuals. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law
Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 267 (1986) (discussing a public/private law distinction based on
the nature of the parties subject to regulation).
3. In this sense, the public aspect of international economic regulation is two-fold: It
involves both domestic public law (antitrust regulation) and international public law (the effect outside
its own territory of a sovereign's authority). Cf. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing ofInterests,
and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 42, 47 (1995) ("[T]he reach of a nation's law is a subject of international law--public
customary international law").
4. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 280 (1982) ("Public international law
regulates activity among human beings operating in groups called nation-states, while private
international law regulates the activities of smaller subgroups or of individuals as they interact with each
other.").
5. This description of the primary emphasis in each area is not intended to suggest exclusive
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The tension between asserting public regulatory interests and facilitating
private international commercial activity is particularly evident in the area of
antitrust regulation. The extent to which the United States may apply its
antitrust laws to foreign conduct (in other words, the extent to which it may
assert its regulatory interests abroad) has been the subject of intense interest
for decades,6 and the language used to discuss this question of extraterritorial
regulation is the language of public law.7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recently reinforced the paramount importance of effectuating domestic
antitrust policy even when the antitrust concerns arise in an international
setting.8 Interestingly, however, this extraterritoriality jurisprudence has
developed independently of (though concurrently with) developments in the
international contract arena. Courts deciding international contract disputes
have subordinated the public interests involved, even where the particular
transactions raise questions of regulatory law, in order to facilitate
international commerce and to permit the greatest possible degree of party
autonomy. 9 In the contract context, regulatory policies are discussed not
within the framework of public law, but as elements in a private-law analysis.
This Article uses the private attorney general mechanism as a framework
to examine the peculiar double role played by U.S. regulatory law-asserted
as the pure manifestation of sovereign interest in one setting, and balanced
against competing policies in the other. Part II discusses the role of the private
attorney general in antitrust law generally and in international antitrust cases
in particular, exploring the discrepant approaches to private antitrust claims in
two litigation settings. Part III analyzes the U.S. approach to extraterritorial
antitrust regulation, examining the expansive role private plaintiffs play in
asserting the public interests embodied in antitrust law. Part IV contrasts that
antitrust jurisprudence with the ongoing marginalization of the private
attorney general in international contract cases, a development that suggests
the predominance of private, rather than public, interests in such litigation. By
examining the disparate treatment accorded the private attorney general in
these two settings, these three parts illustrate the overall inconsistency in the
value assigned to public regulatory interests more generally. Finally, Part V
emphasis. There is of course a public interest aspect to private law, and some public laws serve private
interests as well. See generally Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "'Public Law Taboo" in
International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 302 (1999) (noting that activity subject to
antitrust regulation may inflict "private harms" while many private-law rules serve public efficiency
interests). Indeed, this Article later argues that the public/private dichotomy is in many ways an
insufficient foundation for analysis of international regulatory law. Section V.B infra.
6. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Review Essay: Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws, and the
Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 TEx. INT'L L.J. 71, 72 (1990).
7. EARL W. KINTNER & MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRuST PRIMER 63
(1974) ([A]ntitrust litigation in the United States that concerns the nation's foreign commerce can
present problems that are virtually 'diplomatic' in nature .... ..
S. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). This will be discussed in
detail in Subsection III.B.2 infra.
9. See cases discussed in Part IV infra.
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discusses certain consequences of that inconsistency. It begins by examining
more closely the efficacy of the private attorney general in international cases.
It then takes up the theoretical debate that has framed the discussion of
international antitrust issues: whether conflict-of-laws methodology,
developed for use in private-law disputes, might be used to analyze questions
of regulatory jurisdiction. 1° Drawing on the treatment of antitrust interests in
international contract cases, Part V argues that this debate is largely moot
because questions of regulatory jurisdiction have already proven to be
susceptible to analysis based on traditional conflict-of-laws principles. It
further suggests that such analysis provides a necessary sensitivity, lacking in
the current judicial approach to extraterritoriality, to the relative weight of the
various public and private interests involved in instances of international
regulation.
II. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A. The Role of the Private Attorney General
A private litigant acts as a private attorney general if the litigant asserts a
cause of action not only to obtain compensation, but also to vindicate
important public interests." Although private litigation has been used to
enforce important non-statutory rights, private attorneys general have had a
great impact in enforcing statutory policies.1 2 Indeed, discussion of the private
attorney general's function generally focuses on the particular statutory
mechanisms, such as fee shifting, that are implemented to promote such
litigation. 13  The goal of developing such mechanisms, and thereby
encouraging private litigation, is to deter unlawful behavior by supplementing
the government resources devoted to enforcement. 4 Efforts of governmental
10. For contributions to this debate, see generally, William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and
Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101 (1998);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Lav, and
Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, RECUEIL DES COURS 1979 I, 311; Donald T. Trautman, The
Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory Legislation, 22
OHIO ST. L.J. 586 (1961); Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and
Securities Laws: An Inquiry Into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1799
(1992).
11. In the case giving rise to the phrase, the judge noted that just as Congress could authorize
the Attorney General to sue on behalf of the public, it could also, by statute, authorize suits by non-
official persons "to vindicate the public interest." Assoc. Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d. Cir.
1943). The judge concluded that "[s]uch persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals [sic]." Id.
12. Some statutes explicitly create a private cause of action. See, for example, section I 1 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77, which creates a private cause of action to sue for unlawful
registration statements, and the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), discussed infra. Under other
statutes, the right of a private litigant to act as a private attorney general is implied. See, for example,
section lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78, which has been interpreted as
creating a private cause of action under the securities laws.
13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 217 (1983) (discussing the "key institutions of
the class action and the contingent fee").
14. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) ("[RICO
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agencies to enforce regulatory statutes are enhanced in many areas of law,
including environmental law and securities regulation, by this form of private
litigation.
15
The antitrust laws deliberately adopt the private attorney general as a
mechanism for law enforcement. Specifically, the Clayton Act created an
express remedy for private individuals injured by any violation of the antitrust
laws. 16 An amendment to that statute, contained in the 1976 Antitrust
Improvements Act, created an additional cause of action under which state
attorneys general could assert antitrust claims as representatives of state
citizens. 17 The statute also authorized treble damage awards to plaintiffs' 8 and
included a fee-shifting provision, by which attorneys' fees are awarded to the
successful plaintiff.19 This statutory framework reveals Congress' intention to
motivate a level of private enforcement that would ensure significant
compliance with the antitrust laws.20 In this, Congress was successful, as
private actions have constituted a substantial portion of antitrust litigation.2 '
B. Balancing Public and Private Interests in the International Case
When a private litigant enforces a regulatory statute, the vehicle for that
enforcement is of course a private lawsuit. The action thus has a wholly
private aspect-securing compensation for the victim of a wrong. By
initiating such an action, however, the litigant also vindicates the public
interest for which the statute was enacted. The resulting tension between the
and the Clayton Act] bring to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys general' on a serious national
problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate ....
15. Coffee, supra note 13, at 216.
16. The Clayton Act created a private cause of action for any violation of federal antitrust
laws. It states that a private plaintiff "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (Supp. 1986). This right encompasses violations of the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and parts of the Robinson-Patman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. See
JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI & PETER SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §
160.02[2][b] (1998).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-15(e). This cause of action includes the treble-damages remedy and is
otherwise viewed as analogous to a private action rather than to an action initiated by the federal
agencies. Thus, states (as opposed to the federal agencies) lodging antitrust cases have typically been
classified as private rather than public litigants.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (Supp. 1986) (stating that a private plaintiff "shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained"). The private plaintiffmay also seek injunctive relief under section 26 of the
Clayton Act.
19. Id.
20. E.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 136 (1968), rev'd, 467 U.S.
752 (1984) (recognizing the integral role of private actions in antitrust enforcement). See also
KALINOWSKI & SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 160.01.
21. Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REv. 1677, 1692-93 (1995)
(discussing the predominance of private actions over government enforcement litigation); Steven C.
Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Lawrence J. White, ed. 1986) (setting forth data on the incidence of private
versus government actions).
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public and private aspects of the private attorney general's role has long been
apparent in domestic antitrust litigation.
The domestic cases that explore the public/private tension most directly
are those that developed the standing doctrine in antitrust law. Standing
requirements in antitrust law are designed to bar plaintiffs from asserting
public regulatory interests when the injury suffered was in fact remote from
the antitrust violation alleged. In other words, they seek to weed out cases that
serve only the private goals of the litigant 2 These requirements have at times
been adjusted to reflect attitudes concerning the dual interests at stake.23 In
one period of retrenchment, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the broad
mandate of the Clayton Act to restrict the activity of private attorneys
general. 24 In a related line of cases, courts considered the balance between
private and public interests in developing the "antitrust injury" doctrine. These
cases noted that it would be inconsistent with the goals of the antitrust laws to
permit recovery for private harms that did not implicate protected public
interests. Seeking to avoid "authoriz[ing] damages for losses which are of no
concern to the antitrust laws," they required plaintiffs to establish an injury of
the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.25 Courts have weighed
the public and private interests at stake in other contexts as well. Holding that
the equitable defense of in pai delicto was not a bar to treble-damage actions
brought by culpable plaintiffs, the Supreme Court noted the strong public
interest in using private actions as a deterrent to unlawful behavior.26 Finally,
fluctuations in enforcement patterns reveal similar shifts in the focus on public
and private values. During periods in which a larger percentage of private
lawsuits are "follow-ons" to public enforcement actions, 7 the private value of
22. Stated in summary fashion, the standing requirements provide that a plaintiff must
establish (1) an injury to its business or property that was (2) substantially caused by defendant's
conduct and (3) was of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. KALINOWSKI & SULLIVAN,
supra note 16, § 161.02. In one case discussing the standing requirements, the Supreme Court stated that
"Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain
an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property." Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465,477 (1982).
23. See generally C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies: The
Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. RaV. 1 (1997) (discussing cases in
which courts interpreted standing rules to screen out certain classes of plaintiffs). For a review of
standing jurisprudence, see also Assoc. Gen. Contractors of California v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
24. A.G.S. Elec., Ltd. v. B.S.R. (U.S.A.), Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 707, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(narrowing the Clayton Act's broad statutory grant of the right to sue in recognition of the uniqueness of
the treble damage remedy).
25. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977). The court in that
case held that plaintiffs "must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the
market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 489.
26. Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (rev'd on
other grounds, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)). The Court noted that "[antitrust] law encourages [the plaintiff's)
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition." Id. at 139; see also Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 752
(1984) (holding that the plaintiff's conduct "could not ... immunize [defendants] against liability to
those they injured.").
27. In other words, they arise out of activities that are already subject to investigation or
enforcement action by government agencies.
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compensating the victim takes precedence over the public deterrent value;
conversely, when more private suits are initiated independent of government
action, the emphasis is on the public role of the litigant in bringing to light
antitrust violations that would not otherwise have been prosecuted. 28
While the twin goals of private antitrust litigation in the domestic arena
raise certain complexities there, one thing is clear-the source of applicable
regulatory law. When a private attorney general brings a lawsuit against U.S.
defendants based on conduct taking place within the United States, the court
will apply U.S. antitrust law. In a lawsuit arising from international activities,
however, the role of the private attorney general is more complicated. A U.S.
plaintiff might seek to enforce U.S. antitrust law against a foreign defendant
whose behavior was permitted, or perhaps even compelled, by foreign law.
Later, that plaintiff might seek to enforce a treble damages award in a country
whose own laws would permit only compensatory damages. The regulatory
picture is thus complicated by the fact that a lawsuit initiated by a private
attorney general may be viewed simply as a vehicle for the improper assertion
abroad of the United States' domestic policy interests. As the volume of
international commerce has increased, so too have the possibilities for conflict
generated by the activity of private attorneys general.
C. The Procedural Context of Actions Initiated by Private Attorneys
General
Private litigants tend to invoke the application of antitrust laws in one of
two procedural contexts.29 The first is what might be called a pure statutory
action, in which the plaintiff who has suffered harm caused by the defendant's
conduct exercises his or her right under the Clayton Act to sue for (treble)
compensatory damages. In such cases, there is generally no contractual
relationship between the parties; the typical plaintiff sues a competitor for an
antitrust violation that led to damages. The second context is an action in
which claims under the antitrust laws are raised in litigation based on a
contractual relationship between the parties. 31 Such claims can be raised
28. For an analysis of such cases based on empirical data concerning "follow-on" versus
independently initiated antitrust litigation, see Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private
Antitrust Cases That Follow On Government Cases, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 329 (Lawrence
J. white ed., 1988); see also Varan Gupta, Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J.
2287, 2306-07 (1996) (discussing the proportional increase in private actions in the second half of the
twentieth century). Even follow-on lawsuits have some deterrence value, of course, since the additional
monetary penalties imposed on the defendants add to the deterrence value of governmental enforcement.
29. See generally Salop & white, supra note 21 (setting forth data on different categories of
antitrust litigation).
30. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,487 (1977).
31. John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A Study in
the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 361, 364-65 (1986) (discussing various categories of contractual relationships out of which
antitrust claims often arise).
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offensively-for instance, by a licensee who believes that a breach of contract
by its licensor involves violations of U.S. antitrust law. 32 More often,
however, they are raised defensively in a suit brought by the other party to
enforce a foreign forum-selection or choice-of-law clause contained in the
contract. In that situation, the defendant typically claims that his or her right to
invoke U.S. antitrust laws should not be disturbed by the contractual
agreement.
33
Although the rights asserted by litigants in the statutory and contract
contexts are the same-the right of a private litigant to claim damages
implicating the impairment of a public interest-they have been treated very
differently by the courts. Parts III and IV of this Article discuss these two
models in turn, analyzing the role of the private attorney general in each
setting. They examine the manner in which the judiciary has evaluated the
relative weight of the public and private components of the private attorney
general's role, thereby providing a framework for the later evaluation of the
weight given to public interests in international antitrust law generally.
III. ASSERTING U.S. ANTITRUST INTERESTS ABROAD:
STATUTORY CASES AND THE EXPANDED MANDATE
OF THE PRiVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
U.S. antitrust legislation contains virtually no language addressing its
jurisdictional reach with respect to international commerce: neither the
Clayton Act, which created the private cause of action, nor the Sherman Act,
under which most international antitrust cases arise, speaks to its applicability
beyond the borders of the United States.34 Moreover, the U.S. Constitution
and the principles of international law relating to sovereign jurisdiction do not
prevent the application of U.S. antitrust law to conduct occurring outside the
United States. 1 Clearly, though, Congress could not have intended domestic
32. E.g., Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving allegations that
a licensing agreement between the parties restrained trade).
33. See, for example, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985),
discussed in detail in Subsection IV.A.1 infra.
34. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states that "any person" can sue on the basis of "anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws," thus referring back to the federal antitrust laws themselves for
jurisdictional purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Section 26 of that Act, providing for injunctive relief,
contains similar language. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination.., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... with foreign nations," while section 2 makes it illegal
for a person-defined to include entities organized under the laws of a foreign country-to
"monopolize, or... conspire... to monopolize any part of the trade of commerce... with foreign
nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988). For a discussion of the "inconclusive" legislative history of the
Sherman Act with respect to foreign commerce, see SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 2.3 (1997). The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246, codified in part as 15 U.S.C. § 6(a), introduced certain limiting language
related to the effect of the foreign conduct in the United States. The FTAIA applies only to export trade
of the United States, however, and it has had limited effect on general extraterritoriality analysis since its
adoption.
35. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."); see also Gary B. Born, A
Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 5 (1992)
(discussing the absence of such limits on extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws).
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antitrust law to reach every international transaction tangentially implicating
U.S. interests.36 International antitrust jurisprudence thus seeks to delimit the
boundaries of U.S. law by examining congressional intent in order to define
precisely the reach of the statutes.37
The cases in which courts explored the parameters of regulatoryjurisdiction were based primarily on actions by private plaintiffs that did not
involve the assertion of contractual rights; in other words, to use the
classifications set forth above, they addressed statutory claims by private
attorneys general. Section A and Subsection B.1 below discuss cases in which
courts analyzed the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, examining
in particular the development of the interest-balancing approach that was
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Harford Fire. Although I will
return to these cases in Subsection B.3 of Part V, readers familiar with the
extraterritoriality literature may choose at this point to proceed directly to
Subsection B.2, which picks up with the 1993 decision.
A. The Development of Jurisdictional Tests and the Rise of Interest
Balancing
1. Beyond Territorialism
Early cases focused on determining whether U.S. antitrust laws could in
any circumstances be applied to behavior that took place outside the territory
of the United States. Underpinning this discussion was the assumption that
international law discouraged such extraterritorial application,38 and early
antitrust decisions maintained that the Sherman Act applied only to conduct
taking place within the borders of the United States. As formulated in the
well-known American Banana decision of 1909,39 the prevailing view was
that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly
by the law of the country where the act is done.', 40 During this period, then,
the reach of U.S. antitrust laws was deemed to extend only as far as the
country's borders.4 1 In the area of antitrust law, as in other commercial law
36. KINTNER & JOELSON, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing the adverse consequences that would
follow from such broad application).
37. While this analysis focused almost exclusively on the Sherman Act, the resulting doctrine
was extended to suits under other antitrust laws as well. For a thorough analysis of these efforts and the
conduct and effects tests that they generated, see generally Born, supra note 35; William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85 (1998);
Jonathan Turley, When in Rome: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990); weintraub, supra note 10.
3S. Born, supra note 35, at 10. Born notes the genesis of the famed presumption against
extraterritoriality in The Schooner Charming Betsy, which held that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
39. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
40. Id. at 356.
41. This strict form of territorialism is characterized as a so-called conduct test in that it asks
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areas, however, this strict form of territorialism proved ill-suited to dealing
with the expansion of international commerce.42
Reluctant to abandon entirely the presumption against extraterritoriality,
courts nevertheless began to develop more flexible notions of regulatory
jurisdiction. Antitrust cases following American Banana broadened the scope
of regulatory reach by examining the effects of the conduct in question as well
as the location in which the conduct occurred.43 On this view, regardless of
where the conduct occurred, the reach of U.S. regulations would extend to an
action whose effects were felt within the territory of the United States.44 The
exact formulation of the effects test has varied. Today, the application of
U.S. antitrust law may be predicated on an intended and substantial effect
within the United States.46 To phrase the combined holdings of these cases as
a jurisdictional test, a plaintiff would have to establish conduct either taking
place within the United States or having the requisite effect there in order to
invoke the application of U.S. antitrust law.
In what might be characterized as a second-stage analysis, the debate
then turned to whether the requirement of such a jurisdictional basis was the
only limit on the application of U.S. regulatory law to extraterritorial conduct,
or whether a consideration of additional factors was necessary. Courts and
commentators framed this inquiry in a variety of ways. Some felt that the
question was one of regulatory power itself, suggesting that U.S. antitrust law
did not in fact reach every action that satisfied the jurisdictional standard.47
Others viewed it as a matter of judicial abstention, arguing that while
jurisdiction to regulate existed whenever the jurisdictional standard was met,
courts should decline to exercise it in certain circumstances. 48 On either view,
simply where the conduct in question occurred. It may also be described as "objective territorialism."
Turley, supra note 37, at 605.
42. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1185 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (noting the "vastly altered economic climate since the time of American Banana").
43. This principle is sometimes described as a subjective theory of territorialism. Turley,
supra note 37, at 605.
44. The 1945 case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, most frequently cited as the
turning point for the implementation of the effects test, held that "it is settled law... that any state may
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will
ordinarily recognize." 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. Aluminum Co. of America required intended and actual effects. Id. at 443-44. Other cases
have adopted slightly different formulations. See Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597,
610-11 (9th Cir. 1976), for a survey of cases adopting various versions of the test. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 required "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effects.
15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1988).
46. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("It is well established by
now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States.") (citations omitted); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at
47 (pointing out that Hartford put to rest debate over the formulation of the effects test).
47. Zenith v. Matsuhita, 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1188 n.63 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[C]onsideration of
factors of international comity is part of the jurisdictional determination rather than a separate,
subsequent matter viewed within an abstention framework.'); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and
Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 370, 376 (1983) (describing the test as part of
"determining the existence ofjurisdiction").
48. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979)
("[Hiaving concluded . .. that there is subject matter jurisdiction, the question remains whether
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though, the question was whether some additional inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of the case was relevant to the extraterritoriality analysis-that
is, whether principles of comity dictated the consideration of factors beyond
those analyzed in connection with the preliminary jurisdictional inquiry.
2. The Rise of Interest Balancing
The leading case advocating an interest-balancing approach to the
extraterritorial application of regulatory law is the Ninth Circuit's 1976
Timberlane decision.50 That case involved a claim by Timberlane, an Oregon
partnership, that activities by the Bank of America in both Honduras and the
United States amounted to violations of U.S. antitrust law. 5 1 Timberlane's
complaint alleged a variety of conspiratorial acts whose intent and effect were
to prevent Timberlane's exportation of lumber from Honduras, seeking
damages for that interference under U.S. antitrust laws. 2
The court began its analysis of the reach of the antitrust laws by
reviewing the development of the jurisdictional standard, focusing on
competing articulations of the effects test.53 Throughout this review, though,
the court appeared unwilling to end its analysis there; it seemed inclined
instead to consider the interests of other countries affected by the conduct in
54question. Yielding to this inclination, the court finally concluded that "the
effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations'interests."55 It then introduced a second stage to the extraterritoriality analysis:
jurisdiction should be exercised."); James M. Grippando, Note, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial
Antitrust Jurisdiction on the Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial
Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983) (characterizing such actions as "extend[ing] into aninternational context the domestically established doctrine ofjudicial abstention ... ").
49. Comity, in its classic articulation, is "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens ..." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 164 (1894). Analyzing whether comity should be granted in an international antitrust case requires
an inquiry not only into the effects of the relevant conduct within the United States, but into the
existence of any competing foreign regulatory interests. Consistent with such analysis, some courtsbegan in international antitrust cases to identify and consider the interests of other states involved in the
dispute. Courts believing the question to be one of regulatory power discussed the comity of nations(that is, considerations that would have prevented Congress from extending the Sherman Act to reach
particular conduct at all). Those believing the question to be one of judicial abstention discussed the
comity of courts (considerations that would prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction to adjudicate the
particular case).
50. Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 597.
51. Id. at 601. The plaintiffs also included two Honduran affiliates of Timberlane, while the
defendants included Bank of America's subsidiary responsible for Honduran operations. Because the
plaintiff alleged unlawful conduct occurring within the United States as well as abroad, the case was a
"mixed" case rather than a pure extraterritoriality one.
52. Id. at 604-05.
53. Id. at 610-11.
54. Id. at 609 ("Extraterritorial application is understandably a matter of concern for the other
countries involved."); id. at 610 ("[T]here is no consensus on how far the jurisdiction should extend.").
55. Id. at 611-12.
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The court must consider whether "the interests of, and links to, the United
States... are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority., 56 To assist in this consideration of
competing interests, the Timberlane court suggested a number of relevant
factors designed to evaluate "the relative involvement and concern of each
state with the suit at hand., 57 Only after considering the competing claims of
other countries to regulate the behavior in question, the court believed, could
it determine whether prescriptive jurisdiction could properly be exercised by a
state. 58 It is worth pausing to note that while these factors require the
identification of competing regulatory interests implicated in the case, they do
not mandate an evaluation of the relative value of the different antitrust
policies themselves.
59
In Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corporation,60 the Third Circuit
endorsed the Timberlane approach to the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act. Mannington, a U.S. flooring manufacturer, initiated an action
against Congoleum, a U.S. competitor, arguing that Congoleum had
fraudulently procured patents for certain products abroad and thereby violated
the Sherman Act.61 Mannington's claim raised particularly thorny issues
because it sought not only treble damages, but also an injunction preventing
Congoleum from enforcing foreign patents that were presumed valid.6
Concerned about the potential for international conflict, the court held that an
interest-balancing analysis was necessary before jurisdiction could be
63
exercised. It then adopted, with minor modifications, the Timberlane factors
and remanded the case for their consideration. 64 Although the Mannington
Mills court characterized the issue as one of judicial abstention rather than
statutory reach, it echoed the Timberlane court's reasoning that interest
balancing was a necessary element of extraterritoriality analysis.
6 5
56. Id. at 613.
57. Drawing largely from similar lists included in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES and proposed by Kingman Brewster, the court stated
that the factors to be considered included the following: the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy; the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations; the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance; the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce; the foreseeability of such effect,
and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad. Id. at 614.
58. Id. at 615 n.34.
59. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 27 (1982) ("The Timberlane weighing does not include a balancing of vital
national interests.").
60. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 1290-91.
62. Id. at 1296.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1297-99. By adding as a factor "[p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court
exercises jurisdiction and grants relief," the Mannington Mills test went further than Timberlane to
consider political factors in addition to judicial ones. Id. at 1297.
65. The Timberlane approach was also adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Industrial Investment
Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 885 (1982) and by the Tenth Circuit in Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (1981). See also Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North
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The importance of interest balancing to extraterritoriality analysis was
heightened by the adoption of an interest-balancing approach in the 1986
revision of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third Restatement). 6
The Third Restatement divided jurisdiction into three categories: jurisdiction
to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce. 67 The
applicability of U.S. law to conduct taking place outside U.S. borders is a
question of jurisdiction to prescribe; it deals with the right of a state "to make
its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons." 68 In sections
402 and 403, the Third Restatement addresses the bases of and limitations on
jurisdiction to prescribe. Section 415, which addresses the regulation of anti-
competitive activities in particular, incorporates the approach outlined in those
general sections.
69
The sections of the Third Restatement addressing a state's jurisdiction to
prescribe law provide for a two-stage analysis of the kind discussed above.
The first condition for establishing regulatory jurisdiction is the existence of a
jurisdictional basis (such as conduct within the territory of the state, or
conduct that has or is intended to have substantial effect within that
territory). 70 Once that basis has been established, the court must further
inquire whether the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe law would in the
particular case be "unreasonable." 71 Reasonableness thus operates as a limit
not on the court's discretion to adjudicate the case, but on the reach of
regulatory jurisdiction itself. The factors on which the decision as to
reasonableness is to be based resemble those compiled by the Timberlane
court, focusing on links between the activity in question and the country or
countries seeking to regulate it.72 Like Timberlane and Mannington Mills,
Am. Petroleum, 738 F. Supp. 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the Timberlane case); Dominicus
Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying the
Timberlane test).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987)
[hereinafter THIRD RESTATErENT].
67. Id.§401.
68. Id. § 401(a).
69. Although only the third paragraph of section 415 refers in its text to the reasonableness
standard, the comments to that section state that "[a]ny exercise of jurisdiction under this section is
subject to the [section 403] requirement of reasonableness." Id. § 415 cmt. a.
70. Id. § 402.
71. Id. § 403(1). As the comments to that section put it, "the links of territoriality or
nationality, while generally necessary, are not in all instances sufficient conditions for the exercise of
such jurisdiction." Id. § 403 cmt. a.
72. Section 403(2) of the THIRD RESTATEMENT provides that:
Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined
by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
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then, the Restatement suggested that the establishment of requisite
jurisdictional contacts under either the conduct or effects tests must be
followed by an interest analysis.
B. The Fall of Interest Balancing: Hartford Fire
1. The Case Against Interest Balancing
Despite its adoption in the Third Restatement, the comity-based
approach to extraterritoriality analysis was never the subject of judicial
consensus. Of the decisions that rejected outright the adoption of a balancing
or reasonableness test, the two cases most often cited are Laker Airways v.
Sabena73 and the Uranium litigation.
74
The Laker litigation began with an antitrust action filed in U.S. district
court by Laker Airways, a U.K. company. Laker alleged that a group of U.S.
and foreign competitors had engaged in predatory pricing and other
conspiratorial acts in an attempt to drive Laker out of the transatlantic air
travel market.75 The foreign defendants responded by filing in the United
Kingdom for anti-suit injunctions that would bar Laker from taking any action
against them, in U.S. courts, on the basis of alleged violations of U.S. antitrust
law.76 Laker then returned to the U.S. district court to seek its own order
preventing the U.S. defendants, and two additional foreign defendants, from
obtaining similar anti-suit injunctions.77 The district court granted Laker's
motion for a preliminary injunction against these defendants, stating that an
injunction was necessary to prevent the defendants from "interfer[ing] with
the district court's jurisdiction over the matters alleged in the complaint.,7 8
The foreign defendants appealed, arguing that denying them the opportunity
to take part in the U.K. proceedings violated principles of comity.79 The
primary question before the court was therefore whether it could properly
issue an injunction in protection of its own jurisdiction. Its extraterritoriality
analysis was undertaken in service of this inquiry, as there would be no
jurisdiction to protect if U.S. antitrust laws did not reach the conduct in
question. Thus, the discussion of statutory reach took place within the
framework of a conflict between courts as to adjudicatory jurisdiction rather
than jurisdiction to prescribe.80
(C) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted.
73. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
74. The Uranium litigation comprises a number of individual cases brought in connection
with a uranium cartel operating in the mid-1970s. Infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
75. 731 F.2d at 916-17.
76. Id. at 918.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 919.
79. Id. at 921.
80. Id. at 914-15 ("We review today the limits of a federal court's power to conserve its
adjudicatory authority over a case properly filed with the court .. "). For additional discussion of the
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After reviewing the effects test for extraterritorial regulation, 81 the court
concluded that the acts alleged by Laker created a jurisdictional basis for
application of U.S. antitrust law. Because the court concluded that the activity
also fell within the regulatory reach of British anti-competition laws,
however-in other words, because concurrent jurisdiction existed over the
conduct in question-it then considered whether interest balancing might be
used as a means of preferring one country's claim to regulate over the
other's.8 2 The court rejected that suggestion. It noted that some of the potential
interest-balancing factors would necessarily be neutral as between the
countries involved, 3 and that others were so political as to be inappropriate
for judicial consideration.84 The court concluded by declining to adopt an
interest-balancing approach, stating that it could identify "no neutral principle
on which to distinguish judicially the reasonableness of the concurrent,
mutually inconsistent exercises of jurisdiction."8 5 The decision thus
constituted a rejection of the reasoning contained in Timberlane and the Third
Restatement, then in draft form.
The Laker decision echoed the approach taken in the Uranium litigation,
which involved a series of cases arising from the operation of a uranium cartel
in the early 1970s.8 6 In one of those cases, initiated by the Westinghouse
corporation against a group of domestic and foreign uranium producers, the
court addressed the effect of foreign nondisclosure laws on antitrust litigation
in the United States.8 7 That case addressed the status of certain discovery
demands filed by Westinghouse for documents located in foreign countries.
When several defendants invoked foreign non-disclosure laws as an excuse
for noncompliance, the court considered whether or not to compel production
in the face of those blocking laws.88 After concluding that it had the authority
to enter production orders,89 the court considered whether balancing the
various interests involved might help resolve the stalemate. It concluded that it
would not, and that such a test was "inherently unworkable" in the case. 90 As
did the subsequent Laker decision, the holding questioned the judiciary's
authority to weigh the various interests involved, choosing instead to apply
Laker case, see infra notes 263 through 267 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 922-23.
82. The court also considered other possible tie-breaking mechanisms, such as paramount
nationality. It rejected the argument that Laker's status as a U.K. national required the U.S. court to
defer to the U.K. court's injunctions. Id. at 934-37.
83. Id. at 949.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 953.
86. For a description of the entire litigation, see Lionel Kestenbaum, Antitrust's
"Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, IS STAN. J. INT'L
L. 311, 319-20 (1982).
87. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. II1. 1979).
88. Id. at 1144.
89. Id. at 1145. This is the equivalent of a decision that the straight jurisdictional standard has
been met.
90. Id. at 1148.
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U.S. law where jurisdiction obtained under the effects test.91 In a later stage of
the Westinghouse litigation, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the question
whether interest balancing had to be conducted following establishment of a
jurisdictional basis under the effects test.92 Emphasizing the defendants'
failure to appear in that case, the court distinguished the circumstances present
in Timberlane and Mannington Mills and concluded that an interest-balancing
analysis was not required. 93
2. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California
In Hartford Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially eliminated the use
of judicial interest balancing in extraterritorial antitrust cases. The case
involved the allegations of certain U.S. states and private plaintiffs94 that a
group of domestic and foreign reinsurers had violated the Sherman Act by
forcing primary insurers to restrict the terms of their insurance policies sold in
the United States.95 Defendants located in the United Kingdom moved to
dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that because
their conduct was lawful under U.K. antitrust rules, U.S. antitrust law could
not reasonably be extended to reach it.96 The district court, adopting a
Timberlane approach, dismissed the claims against the foreign defendants on
the basis of comity.97 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed; although it too
considered the Timberlane factors, it held that comity did not justify dismissal
of the considered the Timberlane claims. 98 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the application of the Sherman Act to the conduct of the
foreign defendants.
99
The Court began its analysis by establishing a basis for jurisdiction,
accepting as true the plaintiffs' allegations that the conduct of the foreign
defendants had direct and intended effects in the United States. 100 At that
point, the Court might have addressed the Timberlane-Laker conflict by
asking whether interest balancing should then be conducted. Instead, the Court
91. Id. ("[T]hree foreign governments have enacted nondisclosure legislation which is aimed
at nullifying the impact of American antitrust legislation by prohibiting access to [necessary] documents.
It is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' those totally contradictory and mutually negating
actions.").
92. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
93. Id. at 1255-56.
94. States are accorded private plaintiff status under the Clayton Act. Supra note 17.
95. 617 F.2d at 770-71.
96. These defendants argued in the alternative for a dismissal on the basis of comity.
97. 723 F. Supp. 464 (1989). It held that "the conflict with English law and policy which
would result from the extra-territorial application of the antitrust laws in this case are [sic] not
outweighed by other factors." Id. at 490.
98. 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Unlike the district court, the appellate court believed that the
conflict with U.K. law and policy was outweighed by the intended and significant effects of the conduct
in the United States. Id. at 933-34.
99. 509 U.S. 764, 779 (1983). The other question considered by the Court involved issues of
statutory interpretation concerning the interaction of the Sherman Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
100. Id. at 796 ("[I]t is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct
that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."). The
Court thus ratified the effects test.
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chose to develop an alternative formulation of the test for applying U.S. law.
It inquired "whether 'there [was] in fact a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law."' 01 It defined "true conflict" as a situation in which it is not
possible for the party in question to comply with the laws of both jurisdictions
involved-a situation, in other words, in which behavior that violates U.S.
antitrust law is compelled by the law of another jurisdiction.' 02 The Court
went on to hold that in the absence of true conflict, U.S. regulatory law could
be applied.
10 3
After so narrowly circumscribing the set of situations in which a "true
conflict" might be presented, the Court in Hartford Fire ended its analysis. It
did not discuss what the next step might be if a true conflict were to be
established. Although noting Timberlane, the Court did not address whether it
would ever be appropriate for a court to look to interest balancing, or to
principles of comity generally, in seeking to limit the application of domestic
regulatory law in an international context.1 4 However, the practical impact of
the Court's decision was to reject the interest-balancing approach. In nearly all
cases, once the requisite conduct or effects necessary to establish a
jurisdictional basis have been identified, courts may simply apply domestic
regulatory law.10 5 They need not consider the relationship of the dispute to
any other jurisdiction or to the interests of other governments in regulating the
particular conduct.
C. The Role of the Private Attorney General in Statutory Cases
In Hartford Fire, the Court did not differentiate between classes of
litigants in establishing the "true conflict" threshold.1 6 In other words, its
101. Id. at 797-98 (quoting Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)).
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id. As many commentators have noted, this definition seems to conflate the existence of a
conflict between regulatory regimes with the availability of the foreign compulsion defense. E.g.,
Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 46. Under the foreign compulsion doctrine, private parties will not be liable
for antitrust violations arising from conduct compelled by another government. Interamerican Ref Corp.
v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970) ("When a nation compels a trade
practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the
sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign
sovereigns. By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and corporations.").
104. In cases following Hartford Fire, lower courts have held that a comity analysis remains
appropriate in the presence of a true conflict. See, for example, In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir.
1994), a bankruptcy case viewing "true conflict" as a threshold beyond which a balancing approach is
permitted. In Trugman-Nash v. New Zealand Dairy Bd., 954 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court on
rehearing found a true conflict between U.S. antitrust law and New Zealand law, and then remanded the
case for consideration of the Timberlane factors. A similar approach was adopted in Filetech S.A.R.L. v.
France Telecom, 978 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
105. E.g., U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[Comity concerns
would operate to defeat the exercise ofjurisdiction only in those few cases in which the law of a foreign
sovereign required defendants to act in a manner incompatible with the Sherman Act or in which
compliance with both statutory schemes was impossible.').
106. The Hartford Fire litigation itself was initiated by a group of plaintiffs including a number
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26:219
rejection of an interest-balancing role for the judiciary might affect antitrust
cases initiated by government agencies as well as those initiated by private
attorneys general. In government enforcement actions, however, judicial
interest balancing had never assumed a major role. At least one court
explicitly rejected such analysis as unnecessary to its jurisdictional inquiry.10 7
Others seem simply to have relied on the interest balancing performed by
government prosecutors prior to initiating an enforcement action. In fact,
guidelines issued by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commissionl °8 set forth a list of factors not unlike those included in the Third
Restatement to be considered before an enforcement action is pursued. 09
Considerations of comity, in the sense of sensitivity to foreign interests, would
therefore be taken into account by those responsible for initiating the action.
Thus, interest balancing by the judiciary was deemed by some to be
superfluous in government enforcement actions.11o
This justification for declining to engage in balancing tests does not,
however, apply to situations in which the action has been initiated by a private
plaintiff. In that case, no consideration is given either to the possibility that
another regulatory regime might have an interest in regulating the conduct in
question or, more generally, to the foreign policy implications of the
of private companies and nineteen states, the latter acting as representatives of their citizens.
107. United States v. Baker Hughes, 731 F. Supp. 3, 6 fii.5 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[W]hatever the
relevance of comity concerns in antitrust disputes between private parties, they are not a factor here ....
It is not the Court's role to second-guess the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity
concerns under these circumstances.") (citation omitted).
108. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations (1995) [hereinafter Guidelines], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,107. The Guidelines are discussed in JOSEPH P. GRIFFIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE AGENCIES' GUIDELINES, 53-2ND CORP. PRACTICE SERIES
(BNA 1989) and Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in US. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 188-92 (1999).
109. The factors include: (1) the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within
the United States, as compared to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons involved in or
affected by the conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or
exporters; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United
States as compared to the effects abroad; (5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies; (7) the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to
the same persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and (8) the
effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action. Guidelines, supra note
108, § 3.2.
Although some have suggested that the references to Hartford Fire in the Guidelines indicate a
rejection of interest balancing even in government enforcement actions, Dean Brockbank, The 1995
International Antitrust Guidelines: The Reach of U.S. Antitrust Law Continues to Expand, 2 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 1, 22-23 (1996), the overall flavor of the document reveals a continued commitment to
principles of comity, which has generally been read to include some consideration of balancing factors.
See Diane P. Wood, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations: An
Introduction, 1995 WL 150745 (D.O.J.) 7 ("[C]omity is a flexible enough concept for enforcement
purposes that actions falling short of direct conflicts are nonetheless relevant.").
110. Interestingly, the Guidelines themselves also suggest that courts should refrain from
engaging in interest balancing in actions brought by the government. Guidelines, supra note 108, § 3.2.
Suggestions that interest balancing is necessarily the province of the executive and not the judiciary
have been sharply criticized as an improper application of the separation-of-powers doctrine. E.g.,
Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 53 (describing the argument as thoroughly unsound, because it treats an
issue of law as if it were an issue of politics).
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lawsuit.' After Hartford Fire, actions by a federal agency are subject to
interest balancing while actions brought by private attorneys general-in
service of the same public interests-are not.'
12
In rejecting judicial interest balancing, the Hartford Fire decision
emphasized the strength of the U.S. policy interests reflected in domestic
antitrust law and not the particular concerns that might surround its
application in an international context. It also created a discrepancy between
government and private enforcement activity, vesting the private attorney
general with the power to assert domestic policy even in situations in which a
government agency, considering the international implications of such an
action, might decline to do so. In adopting this approach, it created a quite
expansive role for the private attorney general in international statutory cases.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT CASES:
THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
In a second line of cases, courts addressed the role of domestic
regulatory legislation in the context of international business transactions.
These cases may be generally classified as international contract cases; that is,
they turn on the interpretation and enforcement of forum-selection and choice-
of-law clauses in international agreements. Similar to the statutory cases
discussed in Part I, these international contract cases consider the
applicability of U.S. regulatory law in an international setting. In contrast to
the statutory cases, however, they reveal a focus on private-law values rather
than on the strength or character of the public interest asserted. This focus
manifests itself in judicial unwillingness to insist on the application of
domestic regulatory law in the face of private contractual arrangements. This
part of the Article discusses the manner in which the contract cases have
marginalized the private attorney general by sharply restricting the
circumstances in which private attorneys general can assert U.S. laws abroad.
A. Bremen and Its Descendants: The Role of National Policy in
International Commerce
Contemporary international contract jurisprudence traces its roots to the
1972 decision in Bremen v. Zapata,113 in which the Supreme Court addressed
the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in international agreements.
111. The courts adopting an interest-balancing approach have noted this disparity. E.g.,
Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[Awareness of the possible
foreign implications of the court's action] is especially required in private suits... for in these cases
there is no opportunity for the executive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact .... ").
112. The Guidelines themselves note that "in disputes between private parties, many courts are
willing to undertake a comity analysis." Guidelines, supra note 108, § 3.2. After Harford Fire,
however, courts may do so only where a true conflict has been established.
113. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Bremen involved a contract between Unterweser, a German towing company,
and Zapata, an American oil company, for the towage of Zapata's oil drilling
rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea. The agreement included a forum-
selection clause in favor of the London Court of Justice and also included
exculpatory clauses intended to shield Unterweser from liability in the event
of damage to the oil rig.l14 The rig was damaged in transit, and Zapata sued
Unterweser in the United States District Court in Florida for negligent towage
and breach of contract.115 Unterweser moved to dismiss, citing the forum-
selection clause contained in the towage contract, and it commenced its own
action against Zapata in the London Court of Justice for breach of contract.1
16
Reversing the decisions of the district court and the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court held that Unterweser's motion should have been granted.
In so holding, it rejected Zapata's argument, accepted by the lower
courts, that enforcement of the forum-selection clause would violate U.S.
public policy. This argument, well-articulated in Justice Douglas's dissent,
noted that the exculpatory clauses included in the towing contract would be
unenforceable as against public policy in the United States while they would
be enforced in the English court. 117 It maintained that Zapata's right to invoke
this particular policy should not have been waived by its contractual
agreement to litigate in English courts.118  Although the majority
acknowledged that a violation of forum public policy could overcome the
presumptive enforceability of forum-selection agreements," 9 it held that the
policy barring such exculpatory clauses would not be offended by
enforcement of the particular international shipping agreement considered. 120
In choosing to enforce the forum-selection clause, the Court established
a strong presumption in favor of such agreements: it held that selection
clauses, if validly created, 121 should be enforced unless such enforcement
would be "unreasonable or unjust."122 The decision stressed the importance of
predictability in international commercial transactions, describing the right of
parties to select a forum as an "indispensable element" in international
contracting. 123 In the years following the Bremen decision, courts addressing
international contract controversies of every kind returned to the Supreme
Court's statements regarding the role of party autonomy in an efficient system
114. Id. at 2-3. The exculpatory clauses provided that "[Untenveser and its] masters and crews
are not responsible for defaults and/or errors in the navigation of the tow," and that "[d]amages suffered
by the towed object are in any case for account of its Owners."
115. Id.at3-4.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id.at23.
118. The dissent objected to the use of a foreign forum-selection clause as an evasion of U.S.
law. 407 U.S. 1, 24 at fh.* ("The instant stratagem of specifying a foreign forum is essentially the same
as invoking a foreign law of construction . .
119. Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 16-17.
121. Id. at 15. The Court noted that clauses obtained through fraud or overreaching would not
be entitled to the same presumption.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 13-14.
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of international commerce. 124 The importance to international trade of
enforcing contractual choices of forum and law is described in the decision's
most frequently quoted passage:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must
be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws,
and resolved in our courts.
12
In Bremen itself, party autonomy was promoted at the expense of the
U.S. public interest reflected in the policy against enforcing exculpatory
clauses in carriage contracts. 126 As later decisions adopted and strengthened
the Bremen presumption, the right to freedom of contract was balanced
against a number of other public policies. As these cases reflect, the balance
between implementing public policy and recognizing party autonomy shifted
increasingly further in favor of party autonomy.
1. Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Regulatory Cases
The public policy that would have been served had the Bremen court
refused to enforce the forum-selection clause was arguably not implicated at
all in the case.1 27 More importantly, the policy involved was not what would
generally be described as a regulatory one; it did not implicate the regulatory
function of the state. 12 8 In two subsequent cases, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
12 1
and Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,1 30 the Supreme Court
applied the Bremen presumption to permit the contractual selection of foreign
arbitration in two quintessential regulatory areas-securities and antitrust.1
31
These cases effected a shift away from the traditional position that U.S. courts
reserved jurisdiction over cases involving the application of U.S. regulatory
124. While some definitions of "party autonomy" focus on the freedom of the contracting
parties to choose governing law, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws 858 (3d. ed. 2000),
the freedom to choose a forum for the litigation of future disputes is an equally important pillar of party
autonomy. Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 428-31 (1995). In fact, the Bremen Court addressed directly only the question of
forum selection. But see infra note 150 (discussing of the role of choice of law in the case).
125. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
126. In fact, the majority had argued that the policy against exculpatory clauses was not
implicated at all by the facts in the particular case, reading that policy to reach only purely domestic
towing arrangements. Id. at 15-16.
127. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
128. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REv.
331, 352 (noting that the case did not involve a "public regulatory policy aimed at protecting one party
against the power of the other").
129. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
130. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
131. Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival
Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 66 (1992) (noting that these were
previously considered a "forbidden zone" for arbitration).
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law. 132 In doing so, they expanded significantly the role of party autonomy in
the international contract context.
Scherk, decided two years after Bremen, addressed the enforceability of
a foreign arbitration clause in the context of securities law. The dispute arose
out of a transaction in which Alberto-Culver, a U.S. company, purchased the
enterprises of Scherk, a German businessman. The purchase contract included
a clause specifying the arbitration of any disputes in the International
Chamber of Commerce and the application of Illinois law. 133 Upon
discovering that certain of the trademark rights it had purchased were
encumbered, Alberto-Culver brought suit in United States District Court in
Illinois, alleging that Scherk's misrepresentations constituted violations of
U.S. securities law.134 Scherk then moved to stay the action pending
arbitration in Paris pursuant to the terms of the contract. Alberto-Culver
opposed that motion on the grounds that an agreement to arbitrate securities
claims constituted an impermissible waiver of rights under U.S. securities
laws. 13
5
At the time Scherk was decided, U.S. courts recognized a policy that
claims under U.S. securities laws could be heard only in a judicial forum.
136
The Supreme Court declined to follow that policy in the case, holding that
Alberto-Culver's agreement to arbitrate was enforceable. The Court
emphasized the international nature of the agreement between the parties;
echoing its holding in Bremen, the Court stressed the need for "orderliness
and predictability" in international commerce. 137 The majority did not address
directly the application of U.S. securities laws to the dispute, noting simply
that the contract included a clause selecting Illinois law. 138 Thus, it weighed
the right to freedom of contract in international agreements not against the
substantive interests reflected in domestic securities law, but against the more
general policy that those interests are fundamental enough to require
consideration exclusively in U.S. courts. By striking the balance in favor of
party autonomy-extending the Bremen presumption into the regulatory
132. Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 474-75 (1999) ("Traditionally, the
freedom of parties to privately arbitrate disputes and to contractually choose applicable law ended when
mandatory law began and began when mandatory law ended.").
133. 417 U.S. at 508.
134. Id. at 509.
135. Id. at 509-10. Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that "any...
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this title.., shall be void."
136. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), a domestic securities case, the Supreme Court had
held that only the courts, and not arbitral tribunals, had jurisdiction over suits under the securities laws.
This position has since been abandoned even on the domestic front. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), held that Wilko did not bar the arbitration of claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) directly overruled Wilko, holding that domestic claims under the Securities Act of 1933 could
also be subjected to arbitration.
137. 417 U.S. at 516. In emphasizing the international character of the transaction, the Court
distinguished the case from Wilko by noting that forum selection clauses in international transactions
were likely to be fully negotiated.
138. Id. at 519 n.13. As in Bremen, in fact, it was unclear whether the U.S. law in question was
in fact applicable to the transaction. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 128, at 364.
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arena-the Court accepted a certain weakening of the protection afforded
those fundamental interests.
In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court addressed an antitrust dispute between
Mitsubishi, a Japanese auto manufacturer, and Soler, a Puerto Rican auto
dealership. A distribution agreement between the parties contained a clause
providing for arbitration in Japan of any disputes arising from the
relationship. 139 When such a dispute in fact arose, Mitsubishi brought an
action in United States District Court seeking to compel arbitration; it then
filed a request for arbitration in Japan.140 Soler denied Mitsubishi's allegations
and entered a number of counterclaims, including causes of action under the
Sherman Act alleging anti-competitive behavior by Mitsubishi. 14 In framing
the issue before it, the Court did not speak directly to the extraterritorial
applicability of U.S. antitrust law to the foreign conduct in question. Instead, it
viewed the question before it as one of contract-whether to enforce an
arbitration clause contained in an international contract between two private
parties.
142
The Court decided to enforce the agreement to arbitrate over Soler's
objection that claims under U.S. antitrust law were not arbitrable.1 43 Drawing
on language from previous international contract cases, it based this decision
on considerations of comity, looking to "the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes."' 44 As in
Scherk, the Court viewed the issue as one of forum selection only;145 it did not
address directly the question of governing law. It therefore came to the same
conclusion in the antitrust area that it had come to earlier in the securities
area--despite their fundamental importance, the regulatory claims were not so
important that they could not be considered in an arbitral forum if the parties
had so agreed. 146
139. 473 U.S. 614, 617 (1985).
140. Id. at 618-19.
141. Id. at 619-20.
142. Id. at 624 ("We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an American court should
enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an
international transaction.").
143. Id. at 640. This was the same argument as that raised in the securities context by Wilko-
that claims under the antitrust laws were too important to be heard outside a judicial forum. The Court
had previously determined that the arbitration clause encompassed Soler's antitrust counterclaims. Id. at
628.
144. Id. at 629.
145. In oft-discussed dictum contained in footnote 19 to the majority opinion, the Court notes
that Mitsubishi's counsel had conceded the applicability of U.S. law to Soler's antitrust claims. Id. at
637. The contract itself, however, contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of Swiss law. Some
commentators have argued that the Court's assumption that U.S. antitrust law would be applied was an
evasion of the issue in the face of this choice-of-law clause and considering the role of the arbitrator.
E.g., Ludwig von Zumbusch, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Under US., German and EEC Law: The
"International Transaction " Criterion and Public Policy, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 300-01 (1987).
146. E.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 825 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Ariz. 1993) (reaching the
same conclusion in another antitrust case). In a similar case outside of the antitrust arena, the Supreme
Court enforced an arbitration clause in a shipping contract, holding that such enforcement did not violate
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2. Foreign Choice-of-Law Clauses in Regulatory Cases
The holding in Bremen addressed only the enforcement of a forum-
selection clause. Implicit in the decision, however, was the understanding that
English law would be applied to the dispute. 147 Indeed, the court spoke
broadly of both forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in discussing the
importance of certainty in international contracts. It spoke of rejecting the
"parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts," and noted that "we cannot have [international commerce]
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts." 148 In the Scherk and Mitsubishi cases, while the majority opinions
presented the issue strictly as choice of forum,14 9 the dissenters suggested that
the selection of an arbitral forum implicated choice of law as well. In
Mitsubishi, for instance, the dissenting opinion noted that the decision
amounted to a choice not to invoke applicable U.S. regulatory law,
characterizing the remedy available to Soler in arbitration as "uncertain.'1 °
This concern is well-founded. Since arbitrators are not bound by the
substantive rules of the private law of the jurisdiction most connected with the
transaction, they can not be counted upon to apply even the mandatory law of
that jurisdiction. 151 The question in the cases involving arbitration, then, may
not be merely where the U.S. regulatory laws would be applied, but whether
they would be applied. Taken together, the cases thus suggest that the policy
in favor of party autonomy in international agreements might prevail, even
where the domestic regulatory interests at stake would not be effectuated.
A series of cases involving the Society of Lloyd's, 152 an English
insurance underwriting market, explicitly expanded the Bremen presumption
to reach choice-of-law clauses. In the Lloyd's cases, American plaintiffs
invoked U.S. securities laws in claiming that they were fraudulently induced
to become members of Lloyd's underwriting syndicates. In each of these
cases, the American investors signed a "Member's Agent Agreement" and a
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S.A v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
537 (1995) ("Petitioner's skepticism over the ability of foreign arbitrators to apply COGSA ... must
give way to contemporary principles of international comity and commercial practice.").
147. 407 U.S. 1, 14 n.15 (1972) ("It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the forum clause
was also an effort to obtain certainty as to the applicable substantive law."). Likewise, the dissenting
opinion argued that the effect of the choice-of-law clause was to evade application of domestic law. Id.
at 24 n*.
148. Id. at 9. Outside the regulatory law arena, courts had in the interim read Bremen to apply
to choice-of-law clauses as well. E.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 629.
149. See discussion in Section IV.A supra.
150. 473 U.S. 614, 666 (1983).
151. Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481,490-91 (1981).
152. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Lipcon v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d
1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992). See generally James H. Rodgers,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. Securities Laws: Application to Lloyd's of London Membership
Agreements, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1999) (discussing of the Lloyd's litigation).
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"General Understanding." These agreements contained choice-of-law clauses
selecting English law and forum-selection clauses prescribing litigation or
arbitration in England.153 When the investors brought suit in the United States
under American securities laws, Lloyd's invoked those clauses in moving to
dismiss. 154 In considering those motions, the U.S. courts addressed the issue
as one of contract enforcement. The Seventh Circuit, in a representative
opinion, held that the presumptive validity of the freely negotiated foram-
selection and choice-of-lav clauses had not been overcome by the alleged
existence of securities fraud, citing again the need for predictability and
certainty in international commerce. 55 Interestingly, the court never
considered separately whether the threshold for extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities law had been passed. Its analysis of whether the policies
underlying the securities laws would be effectuated was conducted entirely
within the framework of contractual analysis, focusing on whether
enforcement of the clauses would contravene the public policy of the U.S.
forum.156 Although in the context of securities claims-unlike in antitrust
cases-the court had to overcome a clear statutory mandate against ex ante
waiver of rights under the applicable laws,157 it held that enforcement of the
choice-of-law clauses was reasonable. x58 In extending the Bremen approach
beyond forum selection to choice-of-law clauses, the Lloyd's cases thus
provide further illustration of the recent weakening of the public regulatory
interest in the face of international commercial developments. 59
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision in which it extended the
reasoning of the Lloyd's cases to the antitrust context.' 60 In that case, Simula,
the U.S. inventor of an automotive air bag system, sued Autoliv, a Swedish
supplier of automotive components. 161 The action was based on a
development and licensing agreement that had been executed by the two
companies. Among Simula's claims were allegations that the licensing
153. E.g., Bonny, 3 F.3d at 156, 158.
154. Id. at 157.
155. Id. at 160.
156. Id.
157. Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 contain non-
waiver provisions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a). The antitrust laws, in contrast, contain no provision
expressly prohibiting waiver.
158. 3 F.3d at 160. The court's decision was premised on the similarity of U.S. and U.K.
regulations with respect to the conduct in question. The courts felt that while the Lloyd's plaintiffs might
not be entitled to exactly the same relief under U.K. law as what they would receive under U.S.
securities regulations, the relief would be close enough. Id. at 161-62. But see the suggestion of the
dissent in the Ninth Circuit Lloyd's case that the protections provided by the U.K. laws were in fact
"markedly inferior" to those available under U.S. securities law. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135
F.3d 1289, 1299 (9th Cir. 1998).
159. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 791 (1999) ("The tendency to prefer contractual choices over
regulatory norms exists, even if it has not blossomed into an unequivocal commitment.").
160. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716 (1999).
161. The action also named Autoliv's U.S. subsidiaries. Id. at 716.
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agreement restrained trade in the automotive air bag industry and that Autoliv
possessed monopoly power in one segment of that market.162 Autoliv in turn
moved to compel arbitration under the agreement, which included a provision
selecting arbitration pursuant to International Chamber of Commerce
procedures. 63 The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant
Autoliv's motion, holding that Simula's antitrust claims were fully
arbitrable. 164 Unlike in Mitsubishi, however, the court in this case explicitly
addressed the possibility that U.S. antitrust law would not be applied to the
dispute.
The agreement between Simula and Autoliv appears not to have
included an explicit choice-of-law clause. Thus, the court could not assume
that the arbitrators would apply U.S. law to the antitrust claims.
165
Nevertheless, it rejected as mere "dictum in a footnote" the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Mitsubishi that the operation of choice-of-law clauses to waive a
party's right to pursue statutory antitrust violations would be void on public
policy grounds. 166 It then went on to consider the potential applicability of
Swiss law rather than U.S. law to the antitrust claims. It held the matter to be
governed by the test it had articulated in the Lloyd's case from that circuit:
"[T]he applicable standard should be whether the law of the transferee court is
so deficient that the plaintiffs would be deprived of any reasonable
recourse." 167 It concluded that even if Swiss law were applied to the antitrust
claims, Simula had not established that it would not receive sufficient
protection.
168
Like the Lloyd's cases, this decision casts additional doubt on the
fundamental importance of the role played by regulatory policy-here,
antitrust policy-in international commerce. By applying the Bremen
presumption to validate not just a forum-selection clause but an agreement
that might result in the complete displacement of U.S. antitrust law, the court
valued party autonomy above the regulatory interest expressed in that law.
B. The Role of the Private Attorney General in International Contract
Cases
The increased strength of party autonomy values in cases involving
regulatory law manifests itself in the domestic arena as well as the
international one. Though the Scherk case emphasized the international aspect
162. Id. at 721.
163. Id. at 720.
164. Id. at 723.
165. The decision refers to the arbitration clauses, each of which stated that "[a]ll disputes
arising in connection with [this agreement] shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with
the said rules." Id. at 720.
166. Id. at 723.
167. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998), cited in 175 F.3d at
168. Simula. 175 F.3d at 723 n.4.
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of a securities agreement in deciding to enforce the arbitration clause,169 the
overall trend reflects a gradual change in the status of regulatory law
generally. 170 But in the area of international contract law, where that trend
began and where the arguments in favor of party autonomy are perhaps
strongest, the effect of those developments is particularly striking. The forum
selection cases, and in particular the growth in international commercial
arbitration that they foster, have significantly reduced the number of situations
in which U.S. regulatory law might be invoked by a private litigant.
1. Arbitration and the Public Role of the Private Attorney General
Because the private attorney general asserts his individual interests as
well as those embodied in the law on which his claim is based, the
effectuation of antitrust policy in private cases must always coincide with the
fair resolution of an individual dispute.171 When the parties have chosen
arbitration, however, the policy goals served by private attorney general
lawsuits play a markedly subordinate role in the dispute resolution process.
The downplaying of public interests in arbitration results from certain aspects
of the arbitral process itself. The goal of arbitrators is to resolve the dispute
presented in a manner responsive to the interests of the parties. Unlike judges,
arbitrators need not, and generally should not, consider broader public
interests as well. 172 This focus on the resolution of the individual dispute has
particular consequences for the private attorney general. For instance, once a
dispute enters arbitration, it is unlikely that the treble damage awards
permitted by the Clayton Act will be granted. Therefore, the incentives
designed to generate substantial private enforcement of the antitrust laws are
diminished. 1 3 In addition, the private nature of arbitral decision-making, and
of many arbitral awards themselves, means that arbitrations are less powerful
deterrents than traditional litigation. 74 Thus, even when an arbitrator does
169. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
170. In the domestic context, of course, deferring to party autonomy will not change the choice
of substantive law. Even permitting the arbitration of regulatory claims, however, weakens the
fundamental nature of their character. See Subsection V.B.2.b infra.
171. Sterk, supra note 151, at 508 (noting the coexistence of "antitrust concems" and the need
for "justice between the parties").
172. McConnaughay, supra note 132, at 495-96 ("[P]rivate arbitrators properly define their
responsibilities exclusively in terms of the interests of the parties appearing before them.").
173. Arbitrators are not bound by the regulatory law of the jurisdiction whose law has been
chosen, and they are unlikely to award treble damages partly because they depend on "the acceptability
of their awards to the parties." Carrington & Haagen, supra note 128, at 346. Interestingly, though,
arbitration clauses including explicit waivers of the plaintiff's right to seek punitive damages may be
struck for overreaching. E.g., Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247-1248 (9th Cir.
1994) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause that included the waiver of statutory rights to exemplary
damages and attorneys' fees).
174. While some arbitral procedures require the arbitrators to issue a statement of reasons along
with the award, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, Art. 32 (1988), others,
such as those promulgated under the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, do not even require that. While this
serves the privacy goal of arbitration, it lessens the deterrence value of arbitral awards.
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choose to apply the regulatory law of the United States in a particular
controversy, certain aspects of the private attorney general mechanism are not
being served. The arbitrator's emphasis is on compensating an individual for
the harm he has suffered and not on supporting the role played by that
individual in the antitrust enforcement scheme.
2. The Arbitrability of Statutory Antitrust Claims
Although the arbitral process inherently emphasizes private dispute
resolution over the assertion of public law interests, international contract
cases involving antitrust law might have moderated this effect by recognizing
the dual role of the private attorney general. In fact, though, most of the
decisions in the line of cases following Bremen do not characterize the parties
invoking U.S. regulatory laws as private attorneys general at all. When that
role is mentioned, it is de-emphasized. The Mitsubishi court, for instance,
explicitly downplayed this aspect of the litigation. Although it recognized the
fundamental importance of U.S. antitrust laws to American democratic
capitalism and conceded the centrality of the private cause of action to
enforcing those laws, 175 the Court proceeded to minimize the public aspect of
the private attorney general's role:
Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, the treble-damages cause of
action... seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that
injury .... And, of course, the antitrust cause of action remains at all times under the
control of the individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation to bring an antitrust suit
.... And the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive or judicial approval before
settling one.
176
In a subsequent case involving claims brought under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Supreme Court again
characterized the enforcement function of the private cause of action in
antitrust law as subordinate to its remedial fimction.177 In the cases involving
contract enforcement, the courts in this way focus on the compensatory aspect
of the cases, overshadowing the role of the private cause of action in
effectuating fundamental regulatory policy. This is important in light of two
facts: first, many regulatory violations are alleged by private attorneys general
in cases involving a contractual element; and second, courts will not sever the
175. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,634 (1985).
176. Id. at 635-36 (citations omitted). The dissenting opinion criticized this characterization,
noting that the Court had "always attached special importance to [the role of the private attorney
general] because '[e]very violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system envisaged
by Congress."' Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
177. ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987). Although it
chose to emphasize the remedial function of the private right of action in antitrust, the Court did
acknowledge the importance of its enforcement function, as well, in order to distinguish it from the even
more private right embodied in RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Id. at 241 ("Antitrust violations
generally have a widespread impact on national markets as a whole, and the antitrust treble-damages
provision gives private parties an incentive to bring civil suits that serve to advance the national interests
in a competitive economy.").
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private and public aspects of such an action by permitting statutory claims or
counterclaims to be lodged separately from the contractual ones.
Many cases turning on the private enforcement of regulatory laws
involve a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant. 178 In
Mitsubishi, for example, the dispute arose out of a distribution agreement
between Mitsubishi and Soler; 179 in Scherk, out of a purchase contract
between Scherk and Alberto-Culver; °80 in Simula, out of a development and
licensing agreement between Simula and Autovil.18 1 While this aspect of the
cases has perhaps assisted courts in characterizing them more as disputes
between private parties than as vehicles for the assertion of domestic
regulatory policy, these two roles are not mutually exclusive.
One solution to this duality would be to sever the statutory claims from
the contractual ones; for instance, an agreement to arbitrate might be enforced
as to contractual claims without barring the plaintiff from asserting related
statutory claims in a court.182 This approach did in fact prevail for some time,
during a period in which U.S. antitrust policy was viewed as more important
than the policy favoring arbitration. 83 However, in Mitsubishi itself and in
subsequent cases, courts have clarified how difficult it is for plaintiffs to
separate their rights as private attorneys general-their rights to assert
statutory causes of action-from their agreements to arbitrate "ordinary"
contract issues. In Mitsubishi, the Court found Soler's antitrust counterclaims
to be encompassed by the contractual arbitration clause regardless of their
statutory source. 184 A similar case went even further, concluding that because
the alleged antitrust violations would have also constituted a breach of the
distribution agreement between the parties, the plaintiff was bound to arbitrate
the entire dispute. 8 5 In this sense, agreeing to arbitrate a contractual dispute
involving antitrust issues effectively waives a plaintiffs right, in connection
with that dispute, to assert antitrust interests as a private attorney general. 8 6 If
178. Allison, supra note 31, at 396 ("[1]t is relatively common to find a preexisting contractual
relationship between the parties to a private antitrust dispute.").
179. See the discussion supra note 139 and accompanying text.
180. See the discussion supra note 133 and accompanying text.
181. See the discussion supra note 160 and accompanying text. Other typical situations include
franchise agreements, distributorship agreements, and technology licenses. See Allison, supra note 31, at
365.
182. See Sterk, supra note 151, at 509, for a discussion of the possibility of a bifurcated
approach, and id. at 510-11 for a discussion of practical implementation.
183. E.g., Applied Digital Technology Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 119 n.4
(7th Cir. 1978) ("We are also aware of the federal policy.., favoring resolution of contract disputes by
arbitration and the enforcement of such arbitration agreements. In our opinion, however, that favoritism
must here yield to the more dominant policy."); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679
(5th Cir. 1976) (approving an order under which antitrust claims were to be litigated and the remaining
contractual claims referred to arbitration).
184. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985).
1S5. High Strength Steel, Inc. v. Svenskt Stal Aktiebolag, No. 85C1070, 1985 WL 2546, at *3-
4 (N.D. I11. 1985).
186. This is true not only with respect to rights "created entirely by the contract," Carrington
and Haagen, supra note 128, at 360, but to all related rights, Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc. 175 F.3d 716,
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the antitrust claims are based on the same facts as the contract claims, they
will be subject to the arbitration. 18 Again, since the contract context is one in
which many such violations will be alleged, the result is a limitation on the
private enforcement of regulatory laws in international cases.
C. Conclusion: The Marginalization of the Private Attorney General
Developments in international commercial law have lessened to a
significant degree the utility of the private attorney general mechanism.
Beginning with Bremen, courts in international contract cases have
emphasized not the important public policies manifested in the various
regulatory laws in question, but rather the importance of party autonomy. The
need for certainty and predictability in international commercial
arrangements-private-law values 188-- overcame the specific public interests
involved in the respective cases.189 This focus on party autonomy developed
to the point that, in the international context, courts came to view even
disputes involving regulatory law from the framework of private contract
jurisprudence. Because the parties invoking U.S. regulatory laws are less
frequently viewed as asserting fundamental policies of the sovereign, they
increasingly rarely act as private attorneys general in any meaningful sense.
There are, of course, various justifications for the developments
summarized in this Part, and I do not mean to join the debate as to whether
those justifications are valid. 190 The purpose of this Article is to point out that
the developments in international contract cases create certain inconsistencies
with evolving extraterritoriality analysis as described in Part III. Private rights
under regulatory laws, accorded the status of sovereign policy in the statutory
context, are characterized as "inherently parochial" in the contract cases.
19 1
721 ("[T]o require arbitration, [the plaintiffs] factual allegations need only 'touch matters' covered by
the contract containing the arbitration clause.").
187. Allison, supra note 31, at 417 (discussing Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.,
715 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983) and La Societe Nationale v. Shaheen Natural Res., 585 F. Supp. 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), and noting that in these cases "the court[s] held that any question of contract illegality,
including one arising under the Sherman Act, is for the arbitrator to decide when the governing
arbitration clause is sufficiently broad to encompass such a use").
188. Of course, these values have a public aspect as well. As one of the legal constructs
underpinning our economy, freedom of contract plays a public role. Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts of
Economic Regulation, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 425 (1994) (noting that for that reason it "cannot be said
to serve private goals exclusively").
189. E.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629 ("[Cloncerns of international comity... and sensitivity
to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require
that we enforce the parties' agreement.").
190. Proponents of the arbitration movement point to the speed, relatively low cost, and
certainty associated with commercial arbitrations in defending the expansion of the right to arbitrate. But
see McConnaughay, supra note 133 (criticizing the expanded arbitrability of mandatory-law claims);
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 128 (criticizing the expanded arbitrability of mandatory-law claims).
191. Allison, supra note 31, at 433.
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V. REEXAMINING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTERESTS
IN THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW
As Parts III and IV of this Article have shown, the private attorney
general plays a somewhat schizophrenic role in international antitrust
litigation. In statutory actions, it is an expansive role, as guardian of important
public interests. In contract actions, it is a minor one, overshadowed by other
priorities in international commercial law. In this Part, I suggest that this
duality, and the contextual considerations that created it, shed light both on
antitrust litigation in particular and on the intersection between private values
and regulatory interests in general. This Part turns first to the pragmatic
question of what role the private attorney general can and should play in
international antitrust cases. It then examines more closely the question that
has to a large degree framed extraterritoriality analysis: whether private
conflict-of-laws principles might profitably be imported into the area of
regulatory law.
A. Rethinking the Role of the Private Attorney General
Global commerce forces us to consider how our domestic legal
institutions operate internationally. In the antitrust arena, this means revisiting,
in the light of recent developments, the utility of the private attorney general
mechanism as compared with the hostility it generates in other countries.
Especially in view of the diminishing benefits provided by the private attorney
general in international commerce, 192 the level of international friction caused
by the mere existence of the mechanism gives pause.
The history of the animosity created by U.S. antitrust legislation hardly
needs recounting. Other countries have for decades protested the perceived
aggression with which the United States has imposed its competition laws
abroad. 193 Some of the bases of this reaction, such as broad discovery
procedures 94 or the perceived overextension of the effects test, 195 are common
to all antitrust enforcement efforts, whether private or governmental.
Importantly, recent developments have improved international cooperation in
192. See Section IV.C. supra.
193. WALLER, supra note 34, at § 4.1 (noting the "resentment against perceived American
intrusion into the internal affairs of other countries").
194. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIviL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 847-52
(1996) (discussing foreign reaction to U.S. discovery procedures). Difficulties in reconciling U.S. and
foreign discovery procedures eventually led to the development of the 1970 Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. In 1987, the Supreme Court held that
Convention must provide an optional, rather than a mandatory, framework for gathering evidence in one
state for litigation in another. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482
U.S. 522, 555 (1987).
195. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States
and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 39-41 (1992) (discussing European
reaction to the implementation of the effects test in the United States).
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these areas. Between 1976 and 1999, the United States entered into bilateral
cooperation agreements with Germany,196 Canada,197 Australia, 198 Brazil,' 99
Israel, Japan,2 ' and the European Communities.02 These agreements were
designed to coordinate enforcement activities in the relevant jurisdictions in
international cases. Many of them included guidelines intended to encourage
the full consideration of each country's interests in particular enforcement
activities.20 3 Additionally, the adoption by the European Union of a
jurisdictional basis test similar to the effects test used by U.S. courts has
reduced objections based on perceived jurisdictional overreaching by the
United States.204 As a result of these developments, it is likely that foreign
hostility to the U.S. international antitrust regime has lessened in recent years.
196. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, June 23, 1976, at http:/lwww.usdoj.gov:80/atr/publiclintemationalldocslgermany.
us.txt.
197. Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Application of
National Antitrust Law, March 9, 1984, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,503A; Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Regarding the
Application of Their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, Aug. 3, 1995, at
http://www.usdoj .gov:80/atr/public/intemational/docs/uscan721.wp5.
198. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, at http:lvww.usdoj.gov:80/
atr/public/intemationalldocs/austral.us.txt; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance, Apr. 27, 1992,
at http://wwwv.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/internationalldocs/
usaus7.wp5.
199. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation Between Their Competition Authorities in
the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, Oct. 26, 1999, at http:Ilwww.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/
international/3776.wp5.
200. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the State of Israel Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, Mar. 15, 1999, at
http:llwwv.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/intemational/2296.wp5.
201. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govermnent
of Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, at http://wwv.usdoj.gov:
80/atr/publiclintemationalldocs/3740.wp5.
202. Agreement Between the Government ofthe United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sep. 23, 1991, at
http:/www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/intemational/doeslec.wp5; Agreement Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities on the Application of
Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, at http://vwwv.usdoj.gov:
80/atr/public/intemationalldocsl1781.wp5.
203. Agreement Between the Government of United States of America and the Commission of
the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, supra note 202, at
Art. VI ("[E]ach Party will seek, at all stages in its enforcement activities, to take into account the
important interests of the other Party. Each Party shall consider important interests of the other Party in
decisions as to whether or not to initiate an investigation or proceeding ....) Article VI goes on to set
forth a list of factors relevant to this analysis.
204. In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. Echoing the language of the "substantial and
intended effects" test adopted in the United States, the European Court of Justice analyzed activities of
certain wood pulp producers that had the "object and effect" of impeding competition within the
common market. Attempting to maintain a territorial basis for jurisdiction, the court held that the
conduct had occurred not where the unlawful agreement was formed (outside the Community), but
where it was implemented (within the Community). It then went on to apply EU antitrust law to the
dispute. Id. at 5242; see also Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 563, 578 (2000) ("Foreign governments use extraterritoriality more frequently than ever before,
The Private Attorney General in a GlobalAge
There remain, however, certain objections that are peculiar to the actions
of private attorneys general and that have not been addressed by the
developments outlined above. From a foreign perspective, the availability of
treble damages awards in private antitrust litigation is widely considered to be
one of the most unacceptable aspects of U.S. regulatory law.20 5 Foreign
defendants fear unacceptably large damages awards. Moreover, not sharing
the contingent fee system supported by our multiple damages provisions, they
view such awards as nothing more than rank exorbitance.2  Resistance to this
aspect of U.S. antitrust law is manifested in the blocking statutes enacted in
many countries, which include provisions designed to "claw back" treble
207damages awards granted by U.S. courts. Unlike the objections common to
government enforcement activity, these have not been addressed by the recent
cooperative developments. Whether they are often or only rarely utilized,
then, the mere existence of the incentive structures208 underpinning the private
attorney general mechanism has become a locus of remaining foreign
criticism of U.S. antitrust litigation.20 9
Discussions regarding the proposed Hague Convention on jurisdiction 10
illustrate the extent to which this issue has retained its currency. The
preliminary draft of the proposed Convention provides that non-compensatory
damages awards need not be recognized beyond the extent to which such
taking the sting out of their occasional complaints about its misuse in the United States.").
205. A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION
29-31 (1988). The authors note that the "[m]uch greater fear of the penal aspect of antitrust arises from
the fact that... alleged illegal conduct may lead to private actions for punitive, that is, treble, damages."
Id. at 29.
206. Id. at 29-30.
207. E.g., United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Eng.). Section 6 of
the Act permits British defendants to recover the multiple portion of damages awards entered in favor of
plaintiffs under the Clayton Act. For a discussion of this and other blocking statutes, see Joseph P.
Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws and Transnational Business Transactions: An Introduction, 21
INT'L LAW 307, 308-09 (1987).
208. It is important to note that it is the incentive structures, not the availability of a private
right of action per se, that generate most of this remaining hostility. In a report on cooperation between
the European Commission and national courts within the European Union, the Commission made note
of judicial decisions supporting the existence of private rights under EU antitrust law. Notice on
Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty, 1993 OJ. (C 39) 6. Similarly, the recent proposal for reform of the EU antitrust enforcement
system speaks of "promoting private enforcement through national courts." Proposal for a Council
Regulation, 2000/0243 (CNS), Sep. 27, 2000, at http:lleuropa.eu.intleur-lex/en/com/pdf/2000len_
500PC0582.pdf. These statements reflect some level of consensus internationally on the acceptability of
private enforcement actions.
209. NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 205, at 31 (pointing out that the degree of concern might
in fact be greater than actual litigation experience would warrant).
210. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, provisionally adopted by the Special Commission on June 18, 1999, http:ll
www.hcch.net/evorkprogjdgm.html [hereinafter Draft Convention]. The preliminary draft was revised
at a meeting held at The Hague in October 1999. The final text of the Convention is expected to be
available in 2002. For a thorough analysis of earlier versions of the draft Convention, see Symposium:
Enforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
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damages could have been awarded in the enforcing state.211 Thus, enforcing
States under the Convention would have the discretion to enforce only the
compensatory portion of any antitrust award granted in the United States. This
issue could have been dealt with as a matter of each contracting state's public
policy-in other words, the Convention could have provided that states
choosing to refuse enforcement of multiple-damages awards must rest that
decision on the general public policy exception. 212 The decision of the drafters
instead to address the issue explicitly emphasizes its continued importance.213
More generally, the Convention discussions also demonstrate that the
stakes in international regulation have been raised by the movement in favor
of harmonizing substantive and procedural international law. The stance of the
United States on the question of extraterritoriality has long caused friction,
playing a part in generating some unproductive legislation. 214 In a global age,
it does more. As the debate surrounding the Convention illustrates, that stance
might become a sticking point in a multinational treaty process and thereby
affect chances for increased cooperation on a larger scale.215
Commentators have in the past suggested that treble damages should
simply not be available in private antitrust litigation, thus eliminating the
216
specter of punitive damages awards. This argument is in certain respects
even more compelling in light of the inability of courts after Hartford Fire to
217 seea
consider the interests of other countries in private cases. For several
reasons, permitting U.S. courts to resolve private international antitrust actions
211. Article 33(1) of the Draft Convention refers to "non-compensatory, including exemplary
or punitive, damages." Council Memorandum No. 1 (November 19, 1999) at 15, as submitted to the
American Law Institute.
212. Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need For a Judgments-Recognition
Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 204 (1998).
Article 28 of the Draft Convention provides that "recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be
refused if... manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed." Draft Convention,
supra note 210, at Article 28(I)(f).
213. CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1997) at ch. III, sec. 3, § 2H (discussing various specific proposals
on the question of non-compensatory damages).
214. WALLER, supra note 34, §§ 4.14-4.18 (discussing blocking statutes and other measures
adopted in response to the U.S. approach).
215. Patrick J. Borchers, A Few Little Issuesfor the Hague Judgments Negotiations, 24 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 157, 160 (1998) (suggesting that "the concessions that the United States will have to make
may be so large in relation to the benefit to domestic interests as to doom the possibilities of ratification
[of the proposed Judgments Convention]").
216. Floyd, supra note 23, at 5. See also TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY, AMER. BAR AsS'N
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW MONOGRAPH 13, 50-65 (1986) (summarizing proposals to change the
treble-damages rule). Related proposals have suggested that government agencies play a greater role in
private litigation, assisting in the evaluation of U.S. and foreign interests. WALLER, supra note 34, §
21.24 (discussing the benefits of increased participation in private litigation by U.S. agencies). Yet
others suggest abolishing private actions in the international setting altogether, requiring would-be
plaintiffs instead to obtain government representation. Earl A. Snyder, Foreign Investment & Trade:
Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Law, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 36-37 (1965).
217. This is especially true because, lacking mechanisms for private antitrust enforcement,
other countries rely on the fact that their government agencies can and do exercise their discretion to
stop antitrust investigations if they perceive foreign conflict. Basedow, supra note 188, at 436
(discussing this aspect of antitrust prosecutions in Europe). While U.S. agencies do the same, see supra
notes 109-110 and accompanying text, the failure to impose similar checks on private plaintiffs seems
unwarranted to foreign observers.
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without so considering the foreign interests involved is problematic. First, the
majority of private antitrust cases are not "follow-on" cases-which would
benefit from the interest balancing conducted in antecedent government
actions-but suits brought independent of prior government enforcement. 8
Because private suits are intended partly to catch conduct that would not
warrant the attention of U.S. government agencies,2 19 it is possible that such
litigation would be initiated counter to the general antitrust enforcement goals
of the United States. Second, and relatedly, private suits may be initiated in
situations in which the government had in fact considered enforcement, but
after analyzing the competing interests involved had declined to act.220 Here,
indeed, such litigation might be counter even to the express policy interests of
the government. Third, it is in private actions, not enforcement actions, that
treble damages may be awarded. The imposition of treble damage awards
generates much of the foreign opposition to our international antitrust
regime. 221 Thus, the notion that such awards may be granted without
consideration of the foreign interests involved may exacerbate the
extraterritoriality conflict.
222
Were the antitrust interests asserted by private attorneys general in
international cases of paramount importance to the U.S. regulatory scheme,
foreign dissent generated by the aspects of private litigation described above
might be tolerated as the necessary cost of effectuating those interests.
(Indeed, the approach Hartford Fire mandates in private statutory cases seems
to view potential foreign conflict as just such a cost.) The increasing
marginalization of the private attorney general effected in the international
commerce cases, however, suggests that antitrust interests are not in every
circumstance of paramount importance, and if that is true, then the use of
private litigation in international statutory cases deserves at least a second
look.223
218. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of follow-on cases.
219. WALLER, supra note 34, § 13.39 ("Private parties, . . . with the incentive of treble
damages, may sue even for violations that the government would find too trivial or localized in
nature.").
220. This particular possibility was addressed in the Third Restatement. Comment (g) to
section 415 states that "if the enforcement agency chose not to assert jurisdiction, courts hearing a
private action may consider that fact significant in weighing the interest of the United States against
conflicting interests of other states." THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 415. If judicial interest
balancing is rejected, there is no room for such analysis.
221. See supra notes 202 through 205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the foreign
reaction to this aspect of U.S. antitrust policies.
222. This adds weight to Justice Scalia's objection to the creation of "sharp and unnecessary
conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries .... Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 820 (1993).
223. As the foregoing discussion suggests, I suspect that a strong case could be made for
eliminating the availability of treble damages awards in the international context. Making that case,
however, would necessitate an analysis of the private attorney general's continuing role in the domestic
arena that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Rethinking the Framework for Extraterritoriality Analysis
Comparing the treatment of the private attorney general in statutory and
contractual antitrust cases helps define the role the private attorney general
plays in global commerce. Beyond that, it provides a lens through which to
examine more closely the emphasis placed on the public nature of the
regulatory interest in international antitrust law. This section discusses the
effects of that emphasis on extraterritoriality analysis, suggesting that this
focus on the inherently public nature of antitrust policy is today misplaced.
1. The Public/Private Dichotomy
As the statutory cases discussed in Part m demonstrate, a dominant
issue in recent extraterritoriality jurisprudence concerns the propriety or
necessity of judicial interest balancing. This question has been framed in
broader terms as whether tools developed for resolving conflicts of law in
private disputes are useful in analyzing conflicting claims of regulatory
jurisdiction in international cases.224 Presented in these terms, the debate
draws on the conceptual separation between public and private law, 2 25 and
courts adopting the comity approach have typically described their analysis in26
terms of that separation. 26 The notion of putting private-law concepts to
public-law use was perhaps most sharply focused during the drafting of the
Third Restatement. The drafters noted explicitly that the balancing test
included in Section 403 of the Third Restatement was influenced by the role
of similar tests in the resolution of private conflicts. Specifically, elements of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws227 were incorporated into the
224. See sources cited supra note 10. A court engaging in conflicts-of-law analysis in a private
dispute is of course choosing which law it will apply in deciding the case, whereas a court engaging in
extraterritoriality analysis is simply choosing whether to hear or dismiss the case. Because no court will
apply the regulatory law of another country, the inquiry in an extraterritoriality case is therefore not
strictly speaking a choice of law. Maier, supra note 4, at 290. But the concerns relevant to a decision as
to which state's law applies to a private case resemble those relevant to a decision as to which state's
regulatory law applies to a public one. Trautman, supra note 10, at 602 ("In much the same way that the
conflict of laws has grown out of problems of competing judicial jurisdiction, there may be emerging a
kind of conflicts thinking for the division of legislative competence in matters of economic regulation.").
225. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the public/private distinction.
226. E.g., Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609-10 (1976) (discussing
"limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by 'the Conflict of Laws"') (citing United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
227. Section 6(2) provides that:
When there is no [statutory directive on choice of law], the factors relevant to the choice
of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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Third Restatement, bringing private law-based analysis into the public
sphere.228 In this way the Restatement debate reinforced the conceptualization
of the issue in terms of a public/private dichotomy despite the Third
Restatement's advocacy of interaction between the two spheres.
Perhaps because the viability of interest-balancing methods in regulatory
cases was framed in these terms, much of the criticism directed at those
methods also traded on distinctions between public and private interests. One
important source of reluctance to apply private-law-conflicts thinking to
regulatory cases, for instance, is a belief that the interests considered in
regulatory cases are qualitatively different from those considered in private
tort or contract disputes.229 On this view, the public regulatory interests are so
strong-such pure expressions of sovereign will-that they simply cannot be
weighed against competing interests in a case calling for their application. (In
other words, under a jurisdictional basis test, in a case in which they could be
applied, they must be applied.) A related argument is that regulatory interests,
as legislative policies, can never appropriately be weighed by the judiciary. 23 °
This view also turns on a characterization of regulatory interests as uniquely
important, arguing that any such consideration would interfere with executive
decision-making.231 Overall, the more "public" and therefore unweighable the
character of the regulatory interest, the less fitting a private-law based analysis
would seem.
228. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 66, § 403, rpt. no.10 ("The factors set forth in the
present section... adopt the factors listed in § 6 of the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws."). The
Introductory Note to the Revised Restatement's subchapter on prescriptive jurisdiction states further
courts and other decision makers, learning from the approach to comparable problems in
private international law, are increasingly inclined to consider various interests, examine
contacts and links, give effect to justified expectations, search for the 'center of gravity'
of a given situation, and develop priorities. This Restatement follows this approach ....
See also Lowenfeld, supra note 10, at 329 (setting forth an alternative list of criteria for legislative
jurisdiction that borrows liberally from the Restatement's guidelines).
229. Weintraub, supra note 10, at 1818 ("The sovereign's interest in enforcing its regulatory
rules is of a different order than the 'interest,' meaning the social policy, underlying the rules of torts
and contracts"). See also Maier, supra note 4, at 289 ("A government always has a direct interest in the
outcome of a regulatory case, even when the governmental viewpoint is represented by [a private
attorney general.]").
230. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 955 ("Absent an explicit directive from Congress,
this court has neither the authority nor the institutional resources to weigh the policy and political factors
that must be evaluated when resolving competing claims of jurisdiction. In contrast, diplomatic and
executive channels are, by definition, designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which
accompany the realization of national interests within the sphere of international association.").
231. Id. at 949 ("It is the crucial importance of these policies which has created the conflict. A
proclamation by judicial fiat that one interest is less 'important' than the other will not erase a real
conflict."). But see Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 53 ("That position seems to me thoroughly unsound,
because it treats an issue of law as if it were an issue of politics.").
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2. Lessons From the Private Attorney General
a. Limits of the Public vs. Private Distinction
There is no inherent difference between the regulatory interests asserted
in statutory litigation and those asserted in contract litigation. In either
context, the plaintiff seeks reparation for an injury caused by a violation of
domestic antitrust law. As the fate of the private attorney general in antitrust
litigation demonstrates, however, the setting in which those interests are raised
matters. The form in which the antitrust claims arise might dictate whether the
court would treat the controversy as a private dispute, ignoring the role of the
private plaintiff as enforcer of an important government policy, or would
instead insist on the near-automatic effectuation of that policy.232 Yet the
setting of an antitrust action is somewhat manipulable. In certain
circumstances, the same behavior might support either an action for
enforcement of a contractual clause or a straightforward statutory action under
the Clayton Act.
One recent case illustrates the artificiality of this distinction. In Metro
Industries v. Sammi Corporation,233 the Ninth Circuit addressed a dispute
between Metro Industries, a U.S. importer of kitchenware products, and
Sammi Corporation, a Korean trading company. After conducting business
together for over three years, Metro and Sammi entered into an arrangement
involving the supply of stainless steel steamers. 3 4 Metro provided Sammi
with the models for these products and Sammi then registered the designs with
the appropriate Korean trade association. 35 Sammi agreed to supply Metro
with the steamers for export. Less than two years later, Metro's supply of
steamer deliveries was disrupted, and Metro eventually turned to another
Korean company for the product.236 Metro subsequently brought suit in
United States District Court alleging various violations by Sammi of U.S.
237
antitrust law. Although this was an international business transaction of the
sort typically considered in the contract context, the business arrangement
appears not to have been memorialized by agreement. Thus, no forum-
238
selection or choice-of-law clauses were involved. Metro simply brought a
statutory action, asserting its right as a private attorney general to invoke
domestic antitrust law in seeking recovery from Sammi, and the court
concluded that jurisdiction obtained.23  Presumably, if a contract had existed
and Sammi had moved to enforce a choice-of-law provision contained therein
232. Parts I and IV supra.
233. Metro Indus. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1996).
234. Id. at 841.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 841-42.
237. Id.
238. In any event, the case did not involve a contractual claim based on any such agreement.
239. Id. at 847. The court went on to hold that Metro had failed to establish an antitrust injury
under the Sherman Act. Id. at 848-49.
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in favor of foreign law, Metro would have been foreclosed from asserting that
same right as a counterclaim. 40
b. Questioning the Paramount Importance of Regulatory
Interests
More generally, the treatment of the private attorney general in contract
cases calls into question the characterization of antitrust interests as
unweighable. The line of cases following Bremen has demonstrated that
regulatory interests are, in fact, routinely weighed against competing interests.
In the forum-selection cases, courts found the policy of facilitating
international commerce (and, specifically, the pro-arbitration policy) more
compelling than the policy in favor of reserving regulatory disputes for
adjudication in U.S. courts. The language of those decisions reflects the
courts' awareness that they were indeed engaged in balancing the disparate
interests involved. The Mitsubishi Court, for instance, stated that it would
"weigh the concerns of American Safety [i.e., domestic antitrust policy]
against a strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution
of international commercial disputes and an equal commitment to the
enforcement of freely negotiated choice-of-forum clauses. 24 1 This does not
mean that the Court is weighing U.S. antitrust policy against the antitrust
policy of another country; rather, it is weighing U.S. antitrust policy against
242competing U.S. policies that serve the needs of international commerce.
However, that process reveals the possibility of balancing domestic antitrust
policy against other domestic interests-in other words, it shows that antitrust
policy is not of an order that is inherently unweighable.
Although the Mitsubishi Court spoke of weighing domestic antitrust
concerns, of course, the Court was addressing only the question of where U.S.
antitrust law would be applied, not whether it would be applied.243 In this
sense, the Court's opinion reflected a certain downgrading of the regulatory
interest-it was no longer considered so critical that it could be asserted only
in a judicial forum-but not a judgment that U.S. antitrust laws might be
circumvented altogether. Indeed, the Court reserved on this question, noting
that choice-of-law clauses that operated as a prospective waiver of rights
under the antitrust laws would be unenforceable as against public policy.244
240. This follows the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in the recent Simula case, discussed at supra
notes 160-168 and accompanying text. If only a foreign arbitration clause were at issue, Metro would
have been forced to take its chances that its U.S. antitrust claims would be considered in the foreign
arbitral process. Subsection IV.A.1 supra (discussing the enforceability of arbitration clauses despite the
presence of regulatory law issues).
241. 473 U.S. 614,631 (1985).
242. Cf Maier supra note 4 (discussing the importance of international system needs to a
weighing analysis).
243. 473 U.S. at 635 ("The importance of the private damages remedy, however, does not
compel the conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court.").
244. Id. at 638-40.
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Yet the applicability of domestic regulatory law is unclear when jurisdiction is
ceded to an arbitral forum, particularly in cases in which there is controversy
regarding the governing law.245 The Scherk Court seemed to acknowledge this
uncertainty, rejecting in dicta the view that only "United States laws and
United States courts should determine this controversy in the face of a solemn
agreement... that such controversies be resolved elsewhere., 246 Thus, many
critics of the trend permitting arbitration of regulatory claims suggested that a
decision to enforce arbitration clauses amounted to acknowledgment that U.S.
law might not be applied at all.
247
In the subsequent Lloyd's cases, the courts explicitly accepted the
substitution of foreign regulatory law for domestic securities rules-a
substitution that effected a waiver of precisely the kind contemplated in
Mitsubishi. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Simula, similarly, enforced a
contractual agreement while recognizing that doing so might result in the
displacement of U.S. antitrust law. 248 These cases thus go even farther than
the forum-selection decisions in balancing the interests reflected in regulatory
statutes against interests of party autonomy. If contractual forum-selection and
choice-of-law clauses may operate to prevent the application of regulatory
statutes, the interests those statutes serve can no longer properly be described
as unweighable. 249 And if that is true, then many of the arguments against the
use of interest balancing in statutory cases seem less plausible, as private
conflict-of-laws tools already are used to consider regulatory policies.
3. Revisiting Extraterritorial Regulation
This Article suggests that the view of regulatory law grounding the
interest-balancing debate does not reflect accurately the current status of
regulatory interests. One might argue, though, that the judiciary has simply
gone astray in extending the Bremen presumption to cases involving
regulatory law and then to the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses.250 This
argument would suggest that the character of regulatory law as pure sovereign
policy remains relevant and that the mandatory nature of that law should be
restored in the contract setting.25 1 That action would, in effect, eliminate the
245. Sterk, supra note 151, at 491 (arguing that in such a situation "an arbitration clause is akin
to a clause that provides ... also for the application of a particular forum's laws").
246. 417 U.S. 506,517 (1974) (emphasis added).
247. E.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 128, at 366-67 (noting this possibility with respect
to the Mitsubishi case).
248. Interestingly, unlike the securities laws of the United States and the United Kingdom,
which are quite similar in most respects, the antitrust regimes differ substantially.
249. This argument is analogous to an argument that those laws are no longer mandatory in the
international setting, as they can be derogated from in contract. McConnaughay, supra note 132, at 477
(analyzing the traditional assumption that "contractual choice of law does not displace otherwise
applicable mandatory law).
250. For expositions of this argument, see Borchers, supra note 131; Carrington & Haagen,
supra note 129.
251. Professor McConnaughay has recently made such an argument, proposing the resurrection
of the "public law taboo" preventing contractual derogation from certain mandatory law.
McConnaughay, supra note 5.
The Private Attorney General in a Global Age
inconsistencies identified in this Article in favor of the approach currently
taken in statutory antitrust cases.
I believe that this argument faces the same difficulty encountered in the
debate over extraterritorial regulation in the statutory cases. In adopting a kind
of essentialist characterization of antitrust law, focusing on the inherent nature
of antitrust policy, it under-emphasizes the real distinctions between different
sorts of antitrust claims.25 2 As commentators have noted, the contractual
arrangements of private parties often present no "threat to the public
welfare., 253 That is true not because of the fundamental nature of the statutory
claim being asserted, but because of the overall context in which it is asserted.
While the antitrust laws serve public goals, those goals are not implicated to
the same degree in every case raising antitrust claims. In other words, the
difference between a regulatory claim asserted in what is essentially a contract
dispute between private parties and one asserted in a case involving
widespread harm to U.S. markets should not be obscured by reliance on the
public character of the antitrust law itself.
Importantly, however, these distinctions are not located only in the
presence or absence of a contractual relationship between the litigants. Even
the statutory cases reveal differences in the degree to which public antitrust
interests are implicated in international litigation. The following section
therefore returns to those cases in order to examine more closely the nature of
the antitrust interests they address.
a. A Second Look: Public and Private Interests in the Statutory
Cases
In the cases advocating interest balancing, the anti-competitive conduct
seems to have been directed exclusively at individual competitors. While the
cases did involve adverse effects on U.S. markets, those effects were
characterized as flowing from the injuries suffered by the individual plaintiffs
rather than the other way around. In Mannington Mills, for instance, the action
was based primarily on conduct by the defendant directed at the plaintiff;2 54
252. E.g., McConnaughay, supra note 132, at 495 (suggesting that "mandatory law claims are
more likely than contract or elective law claims to implicate the rights of underrepresented third parties
or the public'); Sterk, supra note 151, at 486 (seeking to distinguish cases in which "the statute or case
law principle at issue has aims other than promoting justice between the parties"). These formulations
ascribe a single set of characteristics to claims under particular statutes, regardless of the context in
which those claims might be asserted.
253. JOHN H. BARCELO III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 243 (1999)(discussing the Mitsubishi decision). See also WARREN F. SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 2 (1981) (citing Continental v. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977), for the proposition that even in the statutory context "the type of case brought in private antitrust
litigation is often socially trivial').
254. Mannington's complaint alleged that the defendant, Congoleum, had fraudulently
procured certain foreign patents and was enforcing them by means of infringement suits. 595 F.2d 1287,
1290 (3d. Cir. 1979).
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indeed, although the complaint suggested that defendants' conduct restricted
not only the plaintiffs foreign business but also that of "other American
competitors," that conduct seemed to be largely the continuation of an
ongoing licensing dispute between the two companies. 255 In discussing the
alleged antitrust violations, the court noted that "[I]f an American company is
excluded from competition in a foreign country . . . , then our national
interests are adversely affected. ' 216 In Timberlane, similarly, the plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had conspired to bar their exports of Honduran
lumber, "thus directly and substantially affecting the foreign commerce of the
United States. '2 7 Again, the conduct was characterized as action directed at
the plaintiff which then has a correlative effect on the overall market. In the
Montreal Trading case, 258 the court discussed more explicitly the balance
between injuries to an individual and effects on the public market. It noted
that a price-fixing conspiracy may injure both its direct victims, who purchase
the goods in question at an inflated price, and also the market generally,
through its effect on non-purchasers. 259 It then disposed of the non-purchasers
for lack of standing, however, stating, "It]hat leaves us with the alleged
concerted refusal to sell to [the plaintiff].",2 0 Again, then, the antitrust claims
appeared to be based on a primarily private harm.
261
As these cases demonstrate, of course, even conduct intended to affect a
particular competitor can have enough of an effect on U.S. markets generally
to create a basis for regulatory jurisdiction. Thus, the private attorneys general
initiating such cases do serve a public interest as well as their own private
goals. However, in these cases the private interests at stake appear relatively
strong compared to the public antitrust interests asserted.262
In contrast to the cases discussed above, those in which the interest-
balancing approach was rejected focused primarily on the public aspects of
the litigation. The Laker case, for instance, was initiated by a private litigant
in much the same circumstance as the plaintiff in Timberlane. Laker Airways
argued that the defendants' unlawful conduct had excluded it from the air-
263travel market. However, the court in Laker cast the alleged conspiracy as
one directed more against the U.S. market than against the individual plaintiff,
noting the impact of the conspiracy on U.S. consumers.264 In addition,
255. Id. (discussing the enforcement actions previously instituted by Congoleum against
Mannington Mills).
256. Id. at 1296.
257. Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597,601 (9th Cir. 1976).
258. Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981).
259. Id. at 867.
260. Id. at 868.
261. See also Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 885 (5th Cir. 1982)
(adopting an interest balancing approach, the Fifth Circuit characterized the private harm and the public
interest as more evenly balanced).
262. Echoing the language used by courts in the contract cases, the Mannington Mills court
cited "the realities of international commerce" as an interest relevant to resolution of the regulatory
dispute. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979).
263. Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a discussion of this case, see
supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
264. Id. at 924 ("The greatest impact of a predatory pricing conspiracy would be to raise fares
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emphasizing the issuance of competing anti-suit injunctions, the court
characterized the entire litigation as resulting from "a clash between two
governments, ',265 noting also the direct involvement of the U.K. government
in the litigation.266 Finally, the court's primary concern throughout the
litigation was protecting its jurisdiction-an entirely public focus. 267 Because
public interests were at the forefront of the case, the litigation was in
important respects quite unlike the primarily private disputes considered in the
cases adopting interest balancing.
In the Uranium litigation, too, the interests of the respective
governments were explicitly made part of the case. In Laker, the foreign
courts involved had issued anti-suit injunctions designed to bar Laker's action
in the United States. In the Uranium litigation, similarly, foreign governments
had enacted blocking legislation designed to render useless the production
268orders issued in the United States. In other words, the dispute directly
implicated competing sovereign actions. It was shaped more by the dispute at
the government level than by the private injuries suffered by the plaintiff.269
Hartford Fire did not involve governmental action in this direct sense.
Nevertheless, the litigation implicated antitrust policy to a greater degree than
the interest-balancing cases. The court described the effects of the defendants'
conduct in broad market terms, depicting the conduct not as behavior aimed
primarily at the plaintiffs, but as "unlawful conspiracies [intended] to affect
the market for insurance in the United States.",270 The inclusion of nineteen
states in the plaintiff group-representing not the interests of domestic
insurance companies injured by the conduct, but the interests of consumers-
highlight the market emphasis. Overall, then, these cases emphasized the
public regulatory interests asserted by the private attorneys general rather than
.the private harms those litigants suffered.
for United States passengers.").
265. Id. at 921.
266. Late in the litigation process, an order was entered pursuant to the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act preventing Laker from proceeding against the British counterparties. As the Zenith
court noted, the "intimate involvement of instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns" changes the
complexion of private antitrust cases. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp.
1161, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
267. Laker, 731 F.2d at 939 ("[T]he violation of public policy vitiating comity is not that the
evasion of United States antitrust law might injure United States interests, but rather that United Statesjudicial functions have been usurped, destroying the autonomy of the courts."). Indeed, the court took up
the extraterritoriality analysis only in order to reach that question. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
268. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (1980).
269. Indeed, the foreign cartel was formed with the encouragement of other governments as a
response to the U.S. government's decision to close the U.S. uranium market to foreign producers.
Kestenbaum, supra note 86, at 320.
270. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
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b. Refocusing the Inquiry
As these decisions reflect, the public interests implicated in statutory
antitrust litigation may appear in relatively strong or in relatively weak
form.271 The assertion of antitrust claims should therefore not operate as an
"off' switch barring consideration of the other interests implicated in the
litigation. Unlike contract actions, statutory antitrust actions do not directly
raise the competing policy in favor of enforcement of contract or the policy in
favor of arbitration. But they do implicate the interests of the United States in
facilitating international commerce and in creating a foundation for the
coordination of economic regulation among sovereigns. Using an unnuanced
characterization of antitrust interests as sovereign policies in order to render
those interests unweighable prevents courts in statutory antitrust litigation
from considering the full range of U.S. interests at stake.
272
VI. CONCLUSION
The role played by the private attorney general in international antitrust
litigation is important in its own right. Nearly all of the cases used to explore
the parameters of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction were initiated by private
plaintiffs rather than government agencies, and antitrust enforcement in
general continues to depend heavily on the contribution of private actors. In
addition, as this Article has argued, litigation initiated by private attorneys
general has become a focal point for what foreign resentment remains
regarding U.S. antitrust law.273 In an era marked by increased cooperation
and, arguably, some degree of convergence with respect to substantive
antitrust standards, the availability of treble damages to private plaintiffs
under the Clayton Act provokes opposition. For that reason alone, a new look
at the means by which such conflict might be minimized is desirable.
Perhaps more importantly, the role played by the private attorney
general is a useful analytical tool. Because it implicates both public and
private interests, analyzing its operation helps to identify points at which the
traditional separation between public and private becomes unproductive. In
antitrust, I have suggested, this conceptual separation encourages courts in
international cases to apply regulatory law in a manner inconsistent with the
role such law plays in the international commercial arena. More generally, this
exercise also illustrates the growing divergence between the legal bases of
271. The same is true, of course, in international contract cases that raise regulatory concerns.
In the Scherk case, a "private" contractual dispute, the dissent argued that it was not merely a private
dispute impacting Alberto-Culver, but one in which the interests of the public, represented by the
shareholders of that company, were implicated. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974).
It thus believed the policy interest reflected in the securities regulations to be relatively strong in that
situation.
272. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 92 (noting generally that "forum courts are apt to give too
much weight to the nation's interest in various local policies and too little weight to its interest in the
international values").
273. Supra Section V.A.
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private economic activity and the theoretical framework we use to consider
questions of economic regulation.
Norms based on the principle of party autonomy shape every aspect of
international commerce, from the formation of economic transactions to the
submission of disputes arising from those transactions for resolution. The way
in which countries compete for regulatory control over international
commerce, however, is highly nationalistic. 274 This is understandable, as our
vision of economic regulation builds on foundations of territoriality and
sovereignty, but it need not be inevitable. Reexamining certain assumptions
that underpin our regulatory approach can reveal alternative methods of
addressing the conflicts generated by global commerce.
274. Dam, supra note 47, at 371 ("In this modem age of nationalism, every nation is
extraordinarily sensitive to other countries' assertions ofjurisdiction that seem to impinge on the sacred
domain of national sovereignty. The irony is that the modem world also generates its own, almost
unavoidable, conditions ofjurisdictional conflict.").
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